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From the Editor
Welcome to the Fall 1999 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management If you take
just a few minutes of your valuable time to scan the contents, I think that you will find
something of interest both personally and professionally. The diversity of articles and
topics covered goes beyond what you would expect to find and is indicative of the diversity
defining our industry. I am always indebted to the authors for their patience, quality of
research and writing, and for thinking of the JTMas an outlet for their work. I offer my
sincere gratitude to the members of the Editorial Review Board who contribute to the
success of this and every issue. Remember that the reviewers are volunteers—they agree
to give their time and expertise and ask for nothing in return. I could not do my job
without them. Steve Rutner and Brian Gibson, my associate editors, continue to add
quality leadership and direction to the Journal Many people contributed to the completion
of this issue. I'm sure that you will enjoy the end result!
The lead article in this issue, by Julie Gentry, Matthew Waller, and Scott Keller, reports the
results of a study of purchasing strategies among manufacturing firms. They identify four
hybrid purchasing strategies that fall between the two extremes of transaction-based and
just-in-time purchasing. The second article, by Rick Clarke, chronicles the development of
U.S. maritime unions and, more recently, their decline in membership and influence.
Changes in union power and influence are also discussed within the context of maritime
policy and regulation. Drew Stapleton and Virginie Saulnier discuss the history of
INCOTERMS in the third article. In addition to carefully contrasting the 1990 and 2000
versions of the INCOTERMS, the article provides a clear and concise description of each of
the 13 international commercial terms. Uma Gupta, Randy Butler, and Thomas Milner offer
an inside look at the development of an automated gate system at Union Pacific Railroad
in the fourth article of this issue. The case study follows the implementation of the system
for fully automating the data collection, inspection, assessment, and reporting of damage
claims to rail equipment. In the final article of this issue, John Kent, Stephen Parker, and
Charles Pettijohn summarize the results of a 1999 survey of truckload shippers concerning
the impact of Y2K on their anticipated volume of shipments and equipment needs. They
also look at what actually occurred in the dry van, temperature controlled, and flatbed
segments of this industry after the new year began. They provide a unique look at the
"before and after" activity associated with the Y2K scare. There should be something for
everyone here. I hope that you take the time to read each of the articles in this issue. I
think you will be glad that you did.

As always, I thank John Youngbeck, CEO of the International Intermodal EXPO, and his
board of directors for their commitment not only to the Journal of Transportation
Management and Delta Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity but also to the
future of logistics and transportation education.
Speaking of commitment and financial support, remember that we cannot survive and
continue to publish without reader support. Please join or renew your membership in Delta
Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity and subscribe to the Journal of
Transportation Management Share this issue with a colleague and encourage him/her to
subscribe today!

Jerry W. Wilson, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management
Georgia Southern University
Southern Center for Logistics and Intermodal Transportation
P.O. Box 8154
Statesboro, GA 30460-8154
(912) 681-0257 (912) 871-1523 FAX
jwwilson@gsaix2.cc.gasou.edu
Stephen M. Rutner, Associate Editor
(912) 681-0588
srutner@gsaix2.cc.gasou.edu
Brian J. Gibson, Associate Editor
(334) 844-2460
bgibson@cob-l.business.auburn.edu
And visit our web sites:
Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity: www.wmgt.org/deltanualpha
Georgia Southern University Logistics: www2.gasou.edu/coba/centers/lit
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EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE
PURCHASING STRATEGIES:
JUST-IN-TIME OR JUST ENOUGH?

Julie J. Gentry
University of Arkansas
Matthew A. Waller
University of Arkansas
Scott B. Keller
Michigan State University

What are the prevalent purchasing strategies used by manufacturing firms to purchase
components that are critical to the quality of their most important products? This research
reports the findings from data on purchasing strategies collected from 248 companies. The
data indicate that although firms seem to be moving away from a transaction-based
purchasing strategy towards "partnership" relations necessary for successful just-in-time
strategies, firms are likely to embrace one of four hybrid purchasing strategies that on a
spectrum would fall somewhere between the two "pure" strategies. These identified strategies
offer purchasing managers viable alternatives to moving directly into a just-in-time
environment.
INTRODUCTION
Effective purchasing strategy can contribute
significantly to the success of most modern
organizations. Surveys of U.S. manufacturing
firms indicate that purchased materials account
for an average of 57 percent of the sales dollar,
while total labor costs (wages, salaries, and
fringe benefits) consist of only one third of the
purchase percentage (U.S. Bureau of Census
1989). Therefore, purchasing dollars must be
managed strategically in order to improve the
financial position of organizations (Reck and

Long 1988). It is also well understood that the
overall quality and service capabilities of any
manufacturing firm are heavily influenced by the
performance of its suppliers. Research suggests
that 50 percent of a company's quality non
conformances are caused by defective purchased
materials (Leenders and Fearon 1993).
Recognizing the importance of the purchasing
functions and their overall effect on a firm's
financial and quality performance, organizations
are expanding the role of purchasing in the
corporate strategic planning process (Fearon
1988).
Fall 1999
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Several strategic decisions under the discretion of
purchasing managers in a manufacturing
environment have been identified in the
literature. Each of these decisions has the
potential to influence a firm's competitive position
(Waller 1993). The most frequently cited of these
decisions are (1) the number of suppliers of
critical components to use, (2) length and type of
contract to use with suppliers, if any, (3)
frequency with which to share production
scheduling or forecasting information, (4) criteria
to be used in selecting suppliers, and (5) the
frequency of deliveries of critical components.
These five purchasing decisions are strategic in
the sense that they have long-term consequences,
pertain to the mutual sharing of critical
information, and result in the selection and
dismissal of suppliers. Reducing the number of
suppliers of critical components has a long-term
consequence because it can often take months or
even years for new suppliers to be able to produce
highly specialized, critical components. This can
be due to the need for specialized manufacturing
equipment or due to the capacity constraints of
the supplier. A long-term contract has long-term
consequences by definition. Frequent sharing of
demand information with a supplier may
eventually entail investment in EDI technology.
The criteria that are used to select suppliers will
have consequences for as long as those suppliers
are used. Finally, moving toward more frequent
deliveries may involve a change in the mode of
transportation, additional investment in
materials handling equipment, and changes in the
receiving and inventory procedures— collectively
implying long-term decisions.
These five decisions are discussed in the
literature within the context of two general
purchasing strategies: just-in-time purchasing
(JITP) using cooperative buyer-supplier part
nerships, and traditional purchasing (TP) in an
open bargaining environment (Waller 1993).
With respect to the five strategic purchasing
decision variables, JITP vis-a-vis TP involves:
using fewer suppliers for a given component
(Ansari and Modarress 1988), longer term
contracts with suppliers (Perry 1988), frequent
2
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sharing of production schedule information
(Trelevan and Schweikhart 1988), using many
criteria—not just price—for selecting suppliers
(Ansari and Modarress 1988), and taking frequent
deliveries of components (Perry 1988).
Crosby (1984), Russell (1985), and Stundza (1984)
suggested that U.S. manufacturing firms wrere
moving away from open market supplier
transactions toward closer buyer-supplier
relations.
Spekman (1988) described these
emerging relationships as “alliances,” Johnston
and Lawrence (1988) as “partnerships,” while
Heide and John (1990) contrasted them with the
more traditional “arm's length” type of
interaction. A strategic partnership between a
purchasing firm and a supplier has been defined
as “a mutual, ongoing relationship involving a
commitment over an extended period of time, and
a sharing of information and the risks and
rewards of the relationship” (Ellram 1990). More
recently, Hendrick and Ellram (1993) indicated
that strategic supplier partnerships have become
an enduring purchasing initiative that may be
necessary for competitive leadership and survival
in the future.
While the use of supplier partnerships is no doubt
growing in popularity, there appears to be a
consensus in the literature that supplier
partnerships develop over time, rather than being
constructed overnight (Ellram 1991).
Furthermore, although several characteristics
have been identified as common among strategic
partnerships when viewed as a whole, there is
also evidence that firms engage in partnership
relations for a variety of reasons and desired
outcomes (Hendrick and Ellram 1993). Based on
the long-term nature of partnership development
and the lack of a single underlying strategic
direction common to partnership relations, it
seems logical to assume that many organizations
do not adhere to a single pure strategy of JITP or
TP, but rather some type that falls in between the
two ends of the spectrum. Therefore, a primary
objective of this research is to assess the use of
pure JITP and TP strategies relative to other
hybrid types of strategies.

BUYER-SUPPLIER PARTNERSHIPS
The purpose of this section of the paper is to
present an overview of the buyer-supplier
partnership concept and its relationship to JIT
purchasing.
First,
various definitions of
partnerships and recurring themes within those
definitions are identified. The second part of this
section provides the linkage between the buyersupplier partnership concept and a
JIT
environment.
Buyer-Supplier
Definitions

Strategic

Partnership

The concept of the buyer-supplier strategic
partnership has numerous definitions and
synonyms in the literature. Although each
definition is unique, there are common
"dimensions" of these relationships that can be
identified by a careful review of the literature.
Several recurring themes are suggested in the
numerous definitions of buyer-supplier strategic
partnerships, including (1) the presence of long
term commitments; (2) information sharing and
open communications; (3) cooperative continuous
improvements on cost reductions and increased
quality; and, (4) the sharing of risks and
rewards of the relationship (Gentry 1994).
Strategic partnerships require a long-term focus
and relations with a limited number of suppliers
(Shapiro 1985). Ohmae (1989) also points out
that coalitions must be long-term, strategic
relationships which must be carefully defined,
developed, and understood to prevent
unreasonable expectations.
A second partnership theme identified in the
review of the buyer-supplier literature is
information sharing and open communications.
More casual and open lines of communication
between the firms allows for increased flexibility
and adaptability (Bevan 1989). Sharing of
information is also essential to accelerating the
product development cycle and speeding the
introduction of new or altered products to the
marketplace.

A third recurring theme found in numerous
definitions of buyer-supplier strategic
partnerships is a cooperative and continuous
emphasis on cost reductions and quality
improvements. Dwyer et al. (1987) suggest that
a buyer's anticipation of high switching costs
increases the buyer's interest in maintaining a
quality relationship. Both buying and selling
firms can enjoy a reduction in administrative
costs since purchase orders, receiving reports,
inspection duties, payment transactions, and
sales calls are decreased (Landeros and Monczka
1989).
A fourth recurring theme found in the literature
on buyer-supplier partnerships is the sharing of
risks and rewards of the relationship.
Companies seek to minimize their degree of
technical or financial exposure, especially when
entering new product markets or expanding the
geographical coverage of an existing market
(Williamson 1975).
Technology and asset
sharing are frequently cited as benefits in
forming strategic partnerships (Landeros and
Monczka 1989). Partnerships allow firms to
share capital investment costs and the
substantial learning costs of introducing new
products or making technological advancements
(Cavinato 1991).
Maintaining close buyersupplier relationships and sharing superior
skills and resources increases the likelihood of
successful product innovations (Landeros and
Monczka 1989).
Use of Partnerships in a Just-in-Time
Environment
The JIT concept has been adopted widely by
purchasing management. To summarize the
concept, its objective is to eliminate waste of all
kinds from the delivery and production systems,
using a method of drawing materials through the
system on an “as needed” basis as opposed to a
“push” system (Hall 1983). The benefits of JIT
implementation include reduced inventory levels,
higher product quality, increased flexibility, and
higher productivity. To achieve the coordination
necessary for effective JIT processes, buyer-
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supplier cooperation must replace open market
competition.
Toyota’s card control system,
Kanban, is a prime example of this concept. In
essence, the whole plant and suppliers act as
progressive work centers where inventory is
staged for production. The system relies on a set
of cards, move and production cards, utilized to
authorize the movement of parts between work
centers and the production of new parts to
replace those used. The card circulation is
placed in motion by requiring the using work
centers to request or retrieve needed parts from
the supplying centers.
Master Lock, a
Milwaukee based manufacturer of padlocks, also
utilizes the JIT concept in their pull system.
Color-coded containers are placed in bins. Each
color represents a lock type and each container
holds a standard lot size of twenty units.
Production needs are withdrawn from the
containers and as a container drops below the lot
size the units are combined with another
container of identical parts and the empty is
returned to the supplying area for
replenishment.
Given the critical nature of suppliers in a JIT
environment, Bagchi (1988), Bookbinder and
Dilts (1989), and O’Neal (1987) indicate that
buyer-supplier partnerships are necessary for
effective operations. It has been suggested that
JIT relationships are the most cooperative buyersupplier relations, due to the level of
interdependence and long-term orientation that
are required. In a comparison of market and JIT
exchange relationships, JIT relations (1) have a
longer term orientation; (2) necessitate frequent
communication between firms; (3) involve
moderate to high levels of specialized
investments; (4) require a reduction in number of
suppliers (with sole-sourcing optimal); (5) involve
a high level of risk; and, (6) necessitate a high
frequency of shipments (Frazier, Spekman and
O’Neal 1988).
The purpose of this discussion is not to advocate
the use of JIT relations, but rather to support
the linkage between the buyer-supplier
partnership and JIT concepts. Although it has
been found that a JIT environment is not
4

Journal of Transportation Management

necessary for a successful buyer-supplier
partnership (Hendrick and Ellram 1993), it can
be posited that buyer-supplier partnerships are
necessary for a successful JIT system.
METHODOLOGY
Literature indicates two widely accepted pure
purchasing strategies; traditional purchasing
and just-in-time purchasing with supplier
partners.
Among the many distinctions,
adopting one strategy over the other has been
shown to dictate how purchasing dollars will be
spent and how firms strategically influence their
long-term direction. Research by Bagchi (1988),
Bookbinder and Dilts (1989), O’Neal (1987), and
others indicates that organizations are moving
away from traditional purchasing and rapidly
adopting the "win-win" philosophy commonly
associated with strategic partnerships.
The
following research questions were identified in
an effort to further establish the utility and
consequences of the various strategic purchasing
decisions made by firms:
1. Do firms tend to use either the pure JITP
strategy or the pure TP strategy?
2. Are other identifiable strategies being used?
3. What decisions have firms made about the
often-cited strategic purchasing variables,
namely, length of commitments, information
sharing, cooperative continuous improve
ments, and the sharing of risks and rewards?
Survey Instrument and Data Collection
To answer these questions, a mail survey was
sent to 1,035 manufacturing firms in the
fabricated metal products industry (SIC 34).
While all of the firms in this study were involved
in metal fabrication of some sort, a broad range
of firm sizes and process technologies—ranging
from job shops to assembly lines—were
represented. For example, represented firms
may include manufacturers of metal cans,
hardware, metal forgings, cutlery, and other
manufacturers of metal and wire products.

Consequently, having selected only one industry
(SIC 34), industry specific variations are
reduced, improving the internal validity of the
study.
Since a wide variety of process
technologies are represented, external validity is
enhanced, improving the general applicability of
the findings.
Questionnaires were sent only to those firms
with 100 or more employees and a purchasing
manager in the manufacturing plant. The
letters were addressed to the mid-level
purchasing managers. After the first mailing, a
reminder letter was sent to non -respondents.
Then a third letter with a copy of the
questionnaire was sent to the remaining non
respondents. After all three mailings, 248
questionnaires were returned, resulting in a 24
percent response rate. To rule out possible
response bias, a difference of means test (T-test)
between early and late respondents was
conducted on various relevant variables and no
significant differences were found.
JIT was not mentioned in the cover letter or
questionnaire to help avoid biases in the answers
to the items on the questionnaire. Neither were
firms asked whether they use buyer-supplier
partnerships; they were simply asked questions
about the five strategic purchasing variables
identified above. The respondents were asked to
answer the questionnaires in reference to one
critical component they purchase for a primary
product since most firms using supplier partner
ships only use it with components that are
critical to quality (Freeland 1991). It was
explained that "critical component" meant a
component having a significant impact on the
quality of the final product and that "primary
product" meant one of the company's leading
products in terms of sales revenue. Although we
were interested in having some firms in the
sample that use JITP, we wanted to have firms
employing many strategies.

RESULTS
The next section deals with the results of the
exploratory empirical investigation. This section
is divided into five subsections, each dealing with
a different strategic purchasing variable. These
include (1) the number of suppliers, (2) the
length of the contract, (3) the sharing of
information, (4) the criteria used for supplier
selection, and (5) the frequency of delivery. The
data include all firms in the sample—not just
those that might be classified as JITP.
Number of Suppliers
Advocates of JITP and supplier partnerships
encourage firms to use fewer suppliers for
critical components, sometimes even suggesting
single sourcing (Deming 1982). It is easier to
manage, for example, two suppliers than it is
twenty; more resources can be expended per
supplier for supplier development when fewer
suppliers are used. Furthermore, when fewer
suppliers are used it is easier to develop closer
relationships with the suppliers, resulting in
better buyer-supplier communication, enhancing
the supplier's ability to meet the demands of the
buyer more accurately. Also, a firm using fewer
suppliers needs each supplier to provide a higher
volume of production of the component that is
being procured than would otherwise be the case.
This facilitates the supplier's path down the
learning curve in terms of cost and quality.
In this survey, respondents were asked how
many suppliers they used over the past year for
the critical component they selected for
answering the questionnaire; Figure 1 shows
the results. As can be seen, 58 percent used five
or more suppliers and 19 percent used only one
supplier. Only 4 percent used dual sourcing, an
often-cited approach to reaping the benefits of
JITP while reducing the possibilities of the
negative outcomes such as disruption of supply
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(Juran and Gryna 1980). Even using a broad
definition of JITP, which allows for the use of
dual sourcing, only 23 percent of the firms used
this strategy—the majority of the firms used five
or more suppliers over the past twelve months.
Length of Contract
The requirements of a strategic partnership
include the need to view the relationship as a
series of exchanges without an endpoint, and the
need to establish various mechanisms to monitor
and execute the operations of the partnership
(Henderson 1990). Perry (1988) found that
companies successful with JITP used long-term
contracts. In a recent study, Helper (1991) found
that the average length of a contract between a
parts supplier and an automotive manufacturer
almost doubled between 1984 and 1989.
This research addresses two primary areas: the
use of contracts and their duration. Figure 2
summarizes the results.
Over half of the
respondents indicated they used contracts of less
than one year, with only 14 percent indicating the
use of contracts for a period beyond two years.
Sharing Information
Another characteristic of JITP and strategic
partnerships is the sharing of production
scheduling or forecasting information with
supplier partners. The sharing of scheduling
information allows the supplier to better plan
production, allowing higher productivity and
quality levels. If a company shared scheduling
information on a weekly basis but it was for a 13
week planning horizon, for example, then that
would be counted as weekly sharing of
production scheduling information. In a JITP
supplier partnership environment, having fewer
suppliers makes it easier to share information
and have more open lines of communication.
Intuitively, if a buyer is willing to reduce its
supplier base, it seems likely that it would
attempt to fully exploit the potential benefits by
sharing scheduling and forecasting information.
As can be seen from Figure 3, almost half of the
companies never share production scheduling or
6
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forecasting information with their suppliers.
Firms are not taking full advantage of a reduced
supplier base.
Criteria for Selecting Suppliers
When utilizing a TP strategy, price is the
predominant supplier selection criterion for
evaluation. In this traditional open market
bargaining environment, price-driven tactics
such as competitive bidding, positional
negotiations, and value analysis are used. Most
of these tactics force suppliers to base their
supplier selection decisions on short-term
considerations. Often the result of this operating
environment is, ironically, lower quality products
and ultimately higher product costs to the buyers
(Hahn, Kim and Kim 1986).
Typical supplier selection criteria include price,
delivery performance, and quality considera
tions. Since supplier partnerships are more
strategic in nature and require a longer-term
planning horizon, the argument has been made
that these relationships require the
consideration of additional factors for selecting
suppliers (Ellram 1990). These include (but are
not limited to) organizational issues such as
cooperation, availability of technology and
financial resources, and other unique factors
that may include safety, location, and a
supplier's existing customer base.
In this study, the respondents were given a
sample list of criteria that might be used for
selecting suppliers:
quality, price, delivery
performance, financial resources, cooperation,
geography (location), and engineering capability.
They were asked to check each one that they
used in selecting the supplier(s) of their critical
component. Figure 4 summarizes the findings,
showing what percentage of firms used various
numbers of the criteria in selecting suppliers.
Only 4 percent of the firms used two or fewer of
the criteria, and 21 percent used all seven
criteria.

underlying goal of small, frequent deliveries is an
overall reduction of inventory and associated costs.

Frequency of Deliveries
To realize the full benefits of JIT, a firm must
receive frequent and reliable deliveries of high
quality parts in small sizes and exact quantities
(Schonberger 1982).
This requires efficient,
reliable communications and information sharing,
which was emphasized in the earlier section
defining the common themes of buyer-supplier
partnerships. Similarly, another theme found in
partnering relations is a cooperative and
continuous emphasis on cost reductions. The

In this study, firms were asked how often they
received deliveries from suppliers of their critical
component. Figure 5 summarizes the findings.
Only two of the 248 companies took delivery of
critical components on an hourly basis. However,
74 of the 248 companies (30 percent) took
deliveries daily, while 75 percent indicated that
their firms took deliveries monthly or less
frequently.

FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS

FIGURE 2
LENGTH OF CONTRACT USED WITH SUPPLIER OF CRITICAL COMPONENT

Length of Contract in Years
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FIGURE 3
FREQUENCY OF SHARING PRODUCTION SCHEDULING OR FORECASTING
INFORMATION WITH SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS

Daily

Frequency of Sharing Scheduling or
Forecasting Information

FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA USED IN
SELECTING SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL COMPONENT:
QUALITY, PRICE, DELIVERY PERFORMANCE, FINANCIAL RESOURCES,
COOPERATION, GEOGRAPHY, AND ENGINEERING CAPABILITY

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of Criteria Used in Selecting
Suppliers

8
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FIGURE 5
FREQUENCY OF DELIVERIES OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS

Frequency of Deliveries

CONCLUSIONS AND
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The survey results indicate that most firms are not
using either a pure TP or JITP strategy. Rather,
firms appear to employ different purchasing
strategies for different components. Based on the
significant correlations from data shown in Table
1, four alternative strategies seem present: the
frequent sharing of information (X3) with long
term contracts (X2) indicates a commitment
strategy; selectivity in choosing suppliers (X4) with
frequent sharing of information (X3) suggests an
information strategy; frequent deliveries (X5) with
selectivity in choosing suppliers (X4) implies an
interaction strategy; and, few suppliers (XI) with
infrequent deliveries (X5) suggests an efficiency
strategy. Each resultant strategy has different
managerial and strategic implications for firms
employing them as discussed in the following
sections.
Commitment Strategy
The commitment strategy involves firms that
frequently share information and engage in long
term contracts with suppliers (refer to Table 1, X3

and X2 respectively). Both elements of this
strategy involve a commitment on the part of the
buyer. The long-term contract reduces the buyer's
flexibility to some extent, although this is
dependent on the details of the specific contract.
The buyer's demonstrated commitment can
facilitate the development of a potentially
successful relationship. The supplier will be more
willing to invest in machines and labor to enhance
its ability to meet or exceed the buyer's
expectations.
Sharing information results in commitment in two
ways: it develops human asset specificity and
physical asset specificity. Human asset specificity
arises due to "learning by doing." This occurs on
both sides of the dyad, since good communication
takes time to develop. Physical asset specificity can
develop as a result of the implementation of EDI.
Additionally, frequent sharing of information can
be both time consuming and expensive.
Both elements of the commitment strategy—
frequent sharing of information and long-term
contracts—are consistent with one another in that
they both represent a commitment on the part of
the buyer to the supplier.
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TABLE 1
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Fewer
Suppliers
(XI)

Length of
Contract
(X2)

Frequency of
Sharing Scheduling
Information (X3)

Number of
Criteria
Used (X4)

Frequency of
Deliveries
(X5)

Fewer Suppliers3
(XI)
Length of Contract (X2)

-0.03

Frequency of Sharing
Scheduling Information (X3)

0.11

0.27*

Number of Criteria Used (X4)

0.04

0.09

0.16*

Frequency of Deliveries (X5)

-0.27*

0.04

0.11

0.22*

* Statistically significant at p < .01.
a The number of suppliers reported was reverse coded; higher levels of XI implies fewer suppliers

Therefore, this strategy is most appropriate in
situations where such a commitment is
important for the successful procurement of
the component. This would be the case, for
example, when it is necessary for a supplier to
buy specialized assets or develop specialized
skills in order to manufacture the component.
Another example would be a situation where a
component's specifications are frequently
changed, making close communications
imperative.
A buyer's commitment to a
supplier can enhance a supplier's willingness
to cooperate with such frequent changes.
Purchasing managers must assess their critical
component manufacturing needs and the
capabilities of suppliers with respect to
fulfilling such requirements. Those firms
requiring very specialized inputs that may not
be easily reproduced, for example, must protect
their sourcing interests by fostering long-term
relationships with willing suppliers. Buyers
must assure that suppliers possess the
strategic and structural ability and willingness
to make the modifications necessary for
providing exact component specifications.
Commitment strengthens as parties become
secure in exchanges based on long-term
10
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contracts. Trust is manifest by investment in
the tools necessary to completely fill the
expectations of the buyer.
Procurement
officers must see that partnering firms’
information systems are adequately integrated
so as to ensure the sharing of important,
sensitive, and timely exchanges.
Information Strategy
The information strategy is composed of two
facets: (1) selectivity in choosing suppliers, and
(2) frequent sharing of information (refer to
Table 1, X4 and X3 respectively). The buyer
may collect information about a potential
supplier's product quality, pricing, delivery
performance, financial stability, willingness to
cooperate, location, and engineering capability.
Based on that information, the buyer decides
whether to use that supplier. After supplier
selection, the buyer begins a regime involving
sharing information with the supplier on a
regular and frequent basis.
When uncertainty about suppliers' abilities to
deliver quality products on-time pervades the
sourcing decision, the information strategy is
most likely to be used. If a company were

purchasing high frequency ultrasonic
transducers for flaw detection, then the
information strategy would be appropriate.
These products are not particularly complex,
but they are typically assembled to order
because of slightly different specifications in
orders. The quality of these components can
vary significantly from one company to the
next, and due to technical reasons, firms
require different quality standards.
Consequently, it pays for companies to be
highly selective in choosing suppliers of these
components. After that, the components often
require on-going adjustments to properly meet
the demands of the buyer. This requires
continual and frequent sharing of information.

deliveries is likely to be successful with this
strategy since the congruency of the two
companies is assured by the up-front
investment of time in the detailed analysis of
the supplier.
Procurement officers are encouraged to identify
their strategy with respect to managing
inventory. Firms requiring minimal inventory
levels will look for suppliers who can
accommodate frequent deliveries.
Due to
holding low levels of inventory, selection of
suppliers must be critical and only those able
to perform this level of delivery service need be
considered.
Efficiency Strategy

Manufacturers of products highly sensitive to
quality specifications must be particularly
critical in supplier selection. Suppliers must
have proven demonstration of adherence to all
performance criteria prior to the business
exchange.
Procurement managers must
develop acceptable criteria ratings and ensure
that the information technology is in place to
effectively disseminate quality specification
updates.
Interaction Strategy
The interaction strategy entails frequent
deliveries of the critical components and high
selectivity in choosing suppliers, both of which
require a great deal of interaction between the
buyer and supplier (refer to Table 1, X5 and X4
respectively). The strategy yields a highly
coupled buyer-supplier dyad where the
feedback loop is minimal and where there is an
appropriate congruency of the buyer's needs
and the supplier's capabilities.
Congruency between the buyer's needs and the
supplier's capabilities is achieved by the buyer
analyzing numerous performance measures in
the supplier selection process.
Once the
supplier is selected, the company using this
strategy maintains a high level of interaction
by taking frequent deliveries of components.
The interaction resulting from the frequent

The efficiency strategy contains two
facets—use of fewer suppliers and less
frequent deliveries (refer to Table 1, XI and X5
respectively). The two facets together lead to
various cost efficiencies in purchasing,
although typically not viewed together in a
single strategy. These two variables together
as part of a pure JITP strategy would entail
the use of fewer suppliers with more
deliveries. However, there is a logical and cost
efficient reason why companies would employ
an efficiency strategy.
The use of fewer suppliers can reduce both
administrative costs and component costs.
Administrative costs can be reduced since
there are fewer suppliers to manage and
coordinate. Additionally, by reducing the
number of suppliers and increasing the volume
purchased from these suppliers, the component
costs can be reduced by leveraging purchase
volumes. Using fewer suppliers makes it
easier for the buyer to take advantage of
quantity discounts, and less frequent deliveries
allow the buyer to gain transportation
efficiencies, thus reducing total delivered cost
of the components.
Consequently, manufacturers purchasing
components with low inventory holding costs or
those most conducive to transportation
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efficiencies are encouraged to employ efficiency
strategies. It is also recommended for those
organizations where the purchasing
department procedures are complex, slow,
unstandardized, and bureaucratic, which
greatly increases ordering and administrative
costs. Therefore, purchasing managers must
identify suppliers associated with volume
discounts and strive to achieve relationships
with select vendors in an effort to ensure large
volume availability and improve future per
unit cost savings.
Ideally, the efficiency
strategy should not be used to cope with such
an inefficient purchasing department; instead,
the company should eventually reengineer the
purchasing process.
In summary, the ways in which the five
strategic purchasing decision variables are
used are manifestations of the purchasing
strategies themselves.
These purchasing
variables can be used in many ways but they
are most often discussed under the rubric of
the JITP strategy, contrasted to the TP
strategy. However, these variables can, and
are, used in other combinations. While there
are many benefits associated with JITP, it does
not make sense to purchase all components
using that strategy. The HP Greeley Division
uses JITP to purchase only about 1 percent of
their parts (Ansari and Modarress 1988).

This research identified four purchasing
strategies that do not clearly fit into any
previous category such as TP or JITP. Firms
are likely to implement one of these four
strategies while moving from a traditional
purchasing strategy into long-term strategic
supplier partnerships and JITP.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
More empirical research in this area is needed
to facilitate a better understanding of these
strategies and their effect on overall firm
performance. Such research should focus on
various components, using a typology of the
components (e.g., critical versus not critical,
cost, quality). While the firms in this study
represented various process technologies, due
to the scope of the sample the results may only
be applicable to the fabricated metal products
industry. Future research should look at how
different categories of purchases should be
managed and investigate cross-industry and
industry-specific patterns of behavior among
firms. Lastly, the effect of buyer supply chain
positioning (channel position) should be
assessed to reveal evidence, if any, that buyers
with greater channel power (i.e., in the
extreme, monopolistic) have a greater
propensity to pursue traditional purchasing
strategies or perhaps natural market forces
lead firms to greater levels of cooperation.
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MARITIME UNIONS AND
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
Richard L. Clarke
Clemson University

U.S. maritime unions have played a vital historical role in both the defense and the economic
development of the United States. The economic and the political forces that helped shape
and promote the growth of U.S. seafaring labor unions changed dramatically in the 1990s.
Maritime union membership in the United States has fallen by more than 80 per cent since
1950. Inflexible union work rules and high union wage scales have contributed to this decline.
Recent regulatory and industry changes require a new union approach if U. S. maritime
unions are to survive the next decade.

INTRODUCTION
In 1994, America’s two largest ocean carriers,
Sea-Land and American President Line (APL)
applied to the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) for permission to change the country
of registry of several of their largest and newest
container ships from the United States to
foreign, so-called flag of convenience countries.
The CEOs of these two companies joined forces
to argue that unless the federal government took
immediate action to create significant new
operating subsidies, their companies would be
unable to continue to compete with foreign-flag
carriers whose crew costs per month are about
one-third that of U.S. flag carriers.
Organized maritime labor vigorously opposed the
reflagging proposal because it would have
eliminated several hundred union jobs. Since
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
ship owners registering their ships in the United
States have been required to crew their ships
with U.S. citizens who are union members. U.S.
16
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maritime labor is organized and controlled by 12
major AFL-CIO chartered unions and 18
company-sponsored unions. Over the past 60
years, maritime unions have in large part
controlled crew size and crew costs on vessels of
U.S. registry. The gauntlet laid down by APL
and Sea-Land posed a serious threat to U.S.
maritime labor unions, whose membership has
shrunk significantly from post-WWII levels.
Fortunately for organized labor, the situation
was resolved in their favor when the Clinton
Administration persuaded Sea-Land and APL to
maintain U.S. registry for the ships at issue by
offering a new operating subsidy bill.
In 1996, after years of intensive lobbying by
several different maritime interest groups,
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of
1996. Under this plan, Sea-Land and APL as
well as smaller operators of U.S.-registered deepsea vessels (U.S. flagships) will receive
significant subsidy payments for designated
ships. In exchange, the carriers must pledge to
provide the subsidized ships to the Department

of Defense upon request to support emergency
military sealift needs. The primary beneficiaries
of this law, Sea-Land and APL, subsequently
dropped their request to change the country of
registry for their ships to foreign countries where
ship operating costs are much lower (called
reflagging or flagging out). Sea-land and APLs’
response to the passage of this new maritime
subsidy program preserves what remains of the
U.S. flag deep-sea fleet. The real underlying
issue that motivated their request for reflagging
was not addressed. The real issue is the
continuing high cost of unionized U.S. maritime
labor relative to the rest of the global shipping
industry.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
impact maritime unions have had on the growth
and development of the U.S. Merchant Marine
through their strikes, lobbying efforts and more
recent cooperation with carrier management.
The development and influence of maritime
unions is traced from the Maritime Security Act
of 1915 to the present. The paper briefly reviews
the history of maritime unions then examines
the impact maritime unions have had on the
formation of national policy regarding the U.S.
Merchant Marine. The paper concludes by
considering the implications of the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) and recent
ocean carrier mergers.
HISTORY OF U.S. MARITIME UNIONS
To understand the impact that maritime unions
have had on the U.S. flag shipping industry, it is
necessary to understand the pervasive nature of
U.S. maritime unions in the industry. U.S.
maritime unions include both licensed and
unlicensed seamen on U.S. flag oceangoing
vessels, Great Lakes ships and inland waterway
tugs and barges. There are two longshoremen’s
unions, five unions for shipyard workers, twelve
primary seagoing unions and nineteen
independent labor unions who do business with
individual oil companies (Heine, 1976). Over the
years these unions became very powerful
because they have had the legal right to

determine crew size and composition for
different classes of ships. More importantly,
U.S. maritime unions are empowered to assign
only union members to crew U.S. flag vessels,
determine what they will be paid and how long
they may be at sea. These powers have enabled
the unions to control the variable cost of
oceangoing labor for U.S. flag shipping.
The Strengthening of Maritime Unions
The genesis of U.S. maritime unions can be
traced back to the Seamen’s Act of 1915. This
act established the legal right of maritime
workers to form unions and create standard
work rules for all their members. This act also
ended imprisonment for deserting one’s ship and
established standards for food and quarters
aboard U.S.-flag ships. There is little doubt the
Seamen’s Act of 1915 was vitally needed to
protect crew members from human rights abuses
by powerful shipping companies and
shipmasters.
The rights of maritime workers were further
strengthened by the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. This law, best known for its creation of
operating (ODS) and construction differential
(CDS) subsidies, improved living and working
conditions for maritime labor. It also empowered
labor unions to select only select union members
for crew duty. A year later in 1937, a federal
commission completed a comprehensive review
of the operation practices of U.S.-flag carriers
and maritime labor union management.
This commission found several problems. The
main problems identified by the commission
included interunion friction, union-shipper
conflict, crew inefficiencies and a general lack of
discipline and order aboard ship (Quartel, 1992).
The commission attempted to solve these
problems through a program that included
subsidies to improve onboard living conditions, a
minimum wage for each rating and manning
scales. Federal guidelines were also enacted to
cover overtime pay, maximum time at sea and
vacation time for union members.
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During the 1930s, maritime unions played a
significant role in improving safety, living
conditions, training, pay and compensation of
labor and made the U.S. maritime industry a
much more desirable place to work. As a result,
there was constant supply of skilled seamen
available to operate an increasing number of
U.S. flag vessels and make the U.S. Merchant
Marine a powerful force as the United States
prepared to enter World War II. Following the
conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Merchant
Marine began a long and steady decline in its
size and strength. As shown from U.S. Maritime
Administration data in Table 1, the number of
U.S. seamen sailing aboard U.S. deep-sea vessels
declined more than 80 per cent from 1950 to
1999 (Marad, 1999). This steep decline closely
paralleled the decline in the size of the U. S.
Deep Sea Fleet from 1100 vessels in 1950 to 283
at the beginning of 1999.

shipping and container handling technology and
(4) large seasonal and annual swings in the
demand for ocean transportation. These and
other factors have led U.S shipowners to reflag
more and more of their ships to reduce operating
cost and be more competitive with low cost
shipping offered by foreign lines. These factors
have combined to put increasing pressure on the
already strained relationship between organized
maritime labor and U.S. carriers. The unions
have consistently strived to raise labor rates and
maintain crew sizes while the owners have
continued to eliminate high-cost union jobs by
registering more vessels in foreign countries like
Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and more recently
the Marshall Islands.
In 1970, the Nixon
Administration tried to resolve some of these
nagging union-management disputes and
revitalize the U.S maritime industry.
Cooperation for Revitalization

TABLE 1
UNION WORKFORCE, 1950-1999

Jobe

Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Maritime
Labor, Training, and Safety

This decline can be attributed to several external
factors including (1) intense competition from
state-owned and state subsidized foreign
carriers, (2) lack of consistent U.S. maritime
promotion policy, (3) growth of container
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The serious deterioration of the United States
Merchant Marine between 1946 and 1969 caused
in part by union-management disputes led to the
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
The goal of this act was to revitalize the U.S.
merchant marine by promoting the construction
and use of American flag ships.
To accomplish this goal, the Act attempted to
control the high cost of operating U.S. flag ships.
Sea-going wages were indexed and crew size was
to be decided in the ship design phase rather
than negotiated by maritime unions. The act
envisioned 300 new U.S. flag ships would be
built in U.S. shipyards by 1980. Unfortunately,
only 63 new U.S. merchant cargo ships were
built and the Act fell far short of revitalizing the
deteriorating U.S. maritime industry (Whitehurst,
1983).
In 1972, several maritime unions agreed to new
rules aimed at increasing cooperation with U.S.
ship owners. Six seagoing and shoreside unions
agreed to rules aimed at increasing maritime
labor stability and improving the image of the
merchant marine. Irwin Heine (1976) lists the
five major provisions of the agreement:

•

No strike during the period of contract
negotiations.

•

Three to five year contracts to provide
assurance with respect to continuity of
operations.

•

Uniform contract expiration dates.

•

Provision for automatic wage adjustments
annually.

•

Establishment of mechanism or procedure for
the resolution of disputes without stoppages.

These new cooperative policies were formulated
by maritime union leadership to foster a spirit of
cooperation with carrier management; however,
the critical issues of crew sizes and ocean going
pay rates were not addressed.
MARITIME UNIONS AND
MERCHANT MARINE POLICY
Maritime unions have been consistent in their
position on merchant marine policy. Their main
goal has always been to protect the American
maritime labor from foreign competition by
supporting policies and programs that promote
the competitiveness of U.S. flag and U.S.
manned vessel operations.
These include
support of the Jones Act and other policies and
reform proposals, which would make it easier for
U.S. operators to acquire new vessels and
operate them under the U.S. flag.
Maritime unions tend to support policies which
would level out the playing field of international
shipping and reduce the need or desire for
American vessel operators to expand their
foreign flag operations. However, U.S. maritime
unions have often been criticized for supporting
protectionist trade policies. In addition, their
lobbying efforts have raised some concern. The
Seafarers International Union and International

Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots are
represented by lobbying groups on Capital Hillthe Transportation Institute and the Maritime
Institute for Research and Industry
Development, respectively.
While these
“institutes” may appear to be research oriented
organizations, they are primarily lobbying
groups.
The Transportation Department’s
Maritime Administration reimburses subsidized
ship companies for the dues, which are paid to
these “institutes.” In essence, the lobbying
efforts of these big groups are being supported by
taxpayer’s money. Such reimbursement has
been estimated at approximately $2 million per
year (Quartel, 1992).
Lobbying Activities of Maritime Unions
Maritime unions also influence legislation by
making PAC (Political Action Committee)
contributions to members of Congress who have
authority over maritime policy. In 1992, for
example, maritime unions contributed nearly
$500,000 to members of the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee. In the same year, the
Seafarers International Union and the National
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
contributed roughly two million dollars to
members of Congress (Quartel, 1992). Maritime
labor unions lobbied hard to get the Maritime
Policy Reform Act of 1992 passed and signed into
law.
Union leaders laid the foundation for maritime
reform with their support of HR1126 in 1991. The
purpose of this legislation was to require foreign
ships to comply
with the National Labor
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. The
unions supported this proposal because they felt
the extension of U.S. labor laws to foreign flag
ships operating in the U.S. would benefit their
interests. The proposal would help by keeping
foreign flag operators from having the competitive
advantage, which they gained, by not having to
adhere to minimum wage levels and working
conditions. U.S. maritime unions lost this battle
when the bill was defeated in Congress.
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Erosion of Maritime Unions in the Early
1990’s
In 1994, the union representing seagoing
engineers, the Maritime Engineers Benefit
Association (MEBA), agreed to a new labor
contract that reduced union compensation in
exchange for better job security. Under these
new contracts most MEBA members starting
receiving reduced benefits, including lower
overtime pay rates. In 1995, there were several
events that weakened organized maritime labor.
During 1995 several more U.S. owned ships were
flagged out, old U.S. flag freighters were retired
and the movement to repeal the Jones Act gained
wider support. The unions also had their share of
serious internal problems. Perhaps the most
significant was the conviction of five officers of
District I/MEBA for conspiracy mail fraud,
extortion, racketeering, and the theft of $6 million
from union members (Shrock, 1995).
This
conviction gave the FBI and the Department of
Labor the impetus to intensify investigations of
maritime union activities and financing
throughout the U.S.
Other maritime unions were also affected by
internal problems and external economic
pressures in 1995-1997. The National Maritime
Union of America lost some of its member U.S.
flag bulk carriers because of severe unionmanagement conflicts. It is likely that union
problems in the nineties are a result of the poor
financial condition of many U.S. flag operators.
As smaller U.S. flag carriers quit the shipping
business, union membership further declined.
Further problems arose when several union
members under federal investigation filed charges
against their own union president (Shrock, 1995).
The nagging problem of what to do about low cost
foreign flag competition was not resolved during
this period. The differential between U.S. union
sea-going wages and those paid by competing
foreign lines remained a major unionmanagement issue as the decade came to a close.
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SEAGOING WAGES
The issue of U.S. Merchant Marine seagoing
wages versus European, Asian, and flag-ofconvenience crews has been hotly debated for
several years. U.S. labor leaders claim U.S.
seamen are not paid significantly higher wages
than foreign seamen. As evidence they cite higher
rates per ton paid by the Defense Department
during the Persian Gulf war to move military
freight on foreign ships versus the same cargo on
U.S. flag ships (Boggs, 1999).
On the other hand, U.S. ships owmers assert that
U.S. crew costs are much higher for the same
class and size ship. They claim U.S. crew costs
average as much as 2.5 times more than flag-ofconvenience crew costs making it economically
infeasible to use U.S. registry without federal
operating differential subsidies (Whitehurst,
1996). Two recent pay studies offer new evidence
to support the agreement raised by U.S. ship
owners.
Published sources from the U.S. Maritime
Administration and the International Transport
Workers Federation reported comparative average
crew costs associated with operating an
equivalent size container ship for one month
(Whitehurst. 1996). These costs in U.S. dollars
are compared in Table 2.

TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE CREW COST FOR A
CONTAINERSHIP BY REGISTRY
(U.S. $)
European

Asian

United States

$80,000

$95,000

$340,000

Source:

Whitehurst (1996). Original source
cited in the article was the Maritime
Administration, “Competitive Manning
of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of
the Maritime Administration, 1995.

A recent breakdown by crew position done by
Whitehurst also shows U.S. crew costs are
significantly higher than European, Asian, or flagof-convenience crew costs (1996) (See Table 3).
It should be noted that the International
Transport Federation (ITF) wage scales apply to
the highest paid 20 percent of flag-of-convenience
vessels. Reliable data on the lowest paid foreign
crews is unavailable, but it is widely believed that
non-ITF crews are paid significantly less that ITF
crews. U. S. maritime unions have dealt with the
pay disparity by lobbying Congress to enact
protectionist legislation that mandates the use of
U. S. ships and U.S. seamen. The most recent
such legislation is the Merchant Marine Act of
1996.
IMPACT OF THE
MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996
As the need to deploy a very large U.S. military
force to the Persian Gulf started to grow in early
1990, maritime labor found a strong ally in the
Defense Department. When President Bush
decided to send military forces to the Persian Gulf
in August of 1990, the U.S. Merchant Marine was
not capable of supplying enough ships or crewmen
to get the job done. The administration was
forced to request merchant shipping support from
its NATO allies. Fortunately, several allies that

supported the policy of military intervention in
the Persian Gulf had sufficient sealift capability
to help and the will to do so. Foreign carriers like
Maersk of Denmark made their ships available to
the U.S. Defense Department. By the time the
deployment (Operation DESERT SHIELD) was
completed, more than 60% of the merchant sealift
of U.S. military supplies and equipment to the
Persian Gulf had been provided by foreign-flag
ships (Pagonis, 1992).
Operation DESERT
SHIELD highlighted the shortage of U.S. cargo
ships and U. S. civilian crewmen and greatly
helped the unions put pressure on Congress to
provide new operating subsidies to guarantee the
future availability of U.S.-flag ships. Five years
after Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait,
Congress passed the Maritime Security Act of
1996.
Eight major unions that fought hard for this new
subsidy bill were the International
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union,
International Organization of Masters, Mates
and Pilots, Maritime Firemen’s Union, Sailors’
Union, Sailors’ Union of Pacific, National Marine
Engineers Beneficial Association, Seafarers
International Union, and American Maritime
Officers. Union leaders emphasized the benefits
of this act on the U.S. economy, employment
rate, and national defense capabilities.

TABLE 3
MONTHLY SEAGOING WAGES (U.S. $)
ITF
European
Asian
Position
U.S. Flag
$9,697
$4,331
Master
$32,653
$2,884
18,727
2nd Officer
7,036
1,979
1,491
Radio Officer
15,142
5,475
2,874
1,491
1st Engineer
23,229
8,425
2,796
1,862
2nd Engineer
18,848
7,845
1,979
1,491
7,619
Chief Steward
9,053
1,491
2,118
Able Seaman
6,022
4,510
1,610
856
Source: Whitehurst (1996). Original source cited in the article was the Maritime Administration,
“Competitive Manning of U.S.-Flag Vessels,” Annual Report of the Maritime Administration,
1995.
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The new law answers the challenge laid down by
Sea-land and American President Lines, at least
for the near-term. It established the Maritime
Security Program (MSP) with new operating
subsidies for 47 militarily-useful U.S. flag ships
over a 10-year period (1996-2005). The owners of
each ship will receive approximately $2.1 million
per ship per year. In return the owners pledge to
maintain U.S. registry and, of course, U.S. crews
on these designated ships.
The Maritime
Security Act of 1996 provides the ship owners
and the labor unions with the first significant
maritime subsidy program since the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970. This Act is designed to
protect U.S. merchant marine jobs, improve
national defense sealift capability and insure a
U.S. flag presence in international shipping
through 2005.
However, recent U.S. ocean
shipping regulatory reform and industry
consolidation may have already diluted the
beneficial impact unions hoped for.
Recent Ocean Carrier Consolidation
In 1999, Denmark’s A.P. Moller, the parent
company of Maersk, purchased the international
division of Sea-Land Services, Inc. This recent
takeover of the largest U.S.-flag carrier follows
the 1997 takeover of American President Line
(APL) by Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) of
Singapore and the 1997 CP Ships (Canadian)
takeover of Lykes, the third largest U.S. ocean
carrier (Beargie, 1999). These mergers have
placed 31 (3 Lykes ships, 9 APL ships and 19 SeaLand/Maersk ships) of the 47 total MSP vessels
under foreign control (Damas, 1999).
For the time being these 31 vessels continue to be
manned by U.S. union seamen. When the MSP
comes up for renewal in 2005, the issue of foreign
ownership may force Congress to find other
alternatives for defense sealift. While it is too
soon to identify all the likely alternatives, it
seems clear the protection of U. S. seafaring jobs
provided by the 1996 Maritime Security Act will
cease in six years or less. Recent U.S. ocean
shipping reform also appears to be having a
detrimental impact on U.S. seafaring labor.
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Impact of U.S. Ocean Shipping Regulatory
Reform
On May 1, 1999, the U.S. Ocean Shipping Reform
Act (ORSA) became effective. This new law
significantly reduces regulatory control of ocean
transportation by the U.S. and encourages
carriers to become more competitive. A major
provision of the new law allows carriers to
negotiate confidential service agreements with
U.S. shippers and importers. Many foreign
carriers have already taken steps to reduce their
operating costs so they can attract new business
by offering lower rates. The general impact on
most sectors of the U.S. economy should be
positive since increased competition usually
fosters better service and lower transportation
cost, which in turn can lower the price of
consumer goods. One sector, which will likely feel
a negative impact, is organized maritime labor. A
less regulated carrier industry will likely force
U.S. ship owners to rely even more heavily on
lower cost foreign crews resulting in a further
decline in U.S. seagoing union labor.
CONCLUSION
Maritime unions have had significant influence on
the United States Merchant Marine. From the
Seamen’s Act of 1915 to the Maritime Security
Act of 1996, maritime unions have helped shape
U.S. maritime policy and have provided high
paying jobs for their members. Maritime unions
have also supplied the manpower necessary for
the sealift of military supplies and equipment in
times of war and national emergency. Most
recently, U.S. merchants ships and U.S. merchant
seamen contributed significantly to the success of
Operation Desert Storm / Shield. However, there
is legitimate concern for the vitality of the U.S.
Merchant Marine in the future.
The recent trend in the global ocean carrier
industry toward consolidation and rationalization
will likely continue. As large foreign carriers like
Maersk and Neptune Orient Lines gain control of
an increasing number of U.S. registered ships,
more union jobs will be lost. Ocean shipping has
become more competitive and shipowners must

operate as efficiently as possible. When the
subsidies guaranteed by the Maritime Security
Act of 1996 expire in 2005, ship owners will find
it difficult to justify the continued use of U.S.
union seamen. While Congress and the maritime
special interests groups debate future political
options to find another temporary fix, it seems a
permanent solution may rest on what the unions
do.
It is clear that owners/operators of U.S. flag ships
want maritime unions to reduce wage rates, crew

sizes, and change other union work rules to lower
operating cost. The renewal of operating sub
sidies for national defense sealift provided by the
Maritime Security Act of 1996 offers U.S. flag
operators and American maritime unions a small
window for finding a permanent solution to
operating cost issues. Perhaps, if both sides now
focus on their mutual interests rather than on
long-held positions over pay and crew size issues,
a lasting solution can be found before the new
subsidy program terminates in 2005.
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ABSTRACT
As trade markets continue to expand due to developments in transportation and logistics
technologies, distribution networks extend well beyond national frontiers. With obstacles such
as distance, language, and business customs, allocation of legal responsibility between a buyer
and a seller of goods becomes even more crucial in international commerce. This document
is presented in three general sections. Reviewing the basics, including definition, origin, use
and classifications of INCOTERMS constitutes the first section. The second section describes
and analyzes the differences between each of the 13 INCOTERMS 2000. Lastly, the changes
introduced by the 2000 revision are studied in more detail in section three and implications
are proffered.

INTRODUCTION
INCOTERMS, an acronym for International
Commercial Terms, are internationally
standardized “trade terms” that describe the
dyadic obligations of both buyers and sellers in
international sales transactions.
Moreover,
INCOTERMS is a set of 13 terms that clearly
allocate the costs, risks, customs, and insurance
responsibilities when internationally
transporting goods between the buyer and seller.
Consequently, it is important to stress that

INCOTERMS deal only with the relation
between sellers and buyers under a contract of
sale. They do not relate directly to the contract
of carriage.
INCOTERMS were first developed in 1936 by the
Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) as a set of international rules for the
interpretation of trade terms (Barelier et al.
1995). These rules, known as “INCOTERMS
1936,” have been subsequently revised.
Amendments and additions were later made in
Fall 1999
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1953, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1990 and presently in
2000 in order to bring the rules in line with
current international trade practices.
INCOTERMS serve much the same purpose for
international trade as the Uniform Commercial
Code does for domestic commerce in the U.S.
(Journal of Commerce, 1999).
It should be stressed that, when the parties
intend to incorporate INCOTERMS into their
contract of sale, they should always make an
expressed reference to the current version of
INCOTERMS. Buyers and sellers willing to use
INCOTERMS 2000 should therefore clearly
specify that their contract is governed by
“INCOTERMS 2000.” Further, the correct use of
INCOTERMS implies that a named port of
destination or named place of destination has to
be stipulated to be valid, followed by the
INCOTERMS version governing their use (e.g.,
EXW La Crosse, WI - INCOTERMS 2000; FAS
Norfolk, VA - INCOTERMS 2000).
The trade terms have been put together in four
different groups: E, F, C, and D.
Group E
Group ‘E’ (for “Ex” or from) represents the
minimum responsibility for the seller, and
maximum responsibility for the buyer. In this
group, the seller is only responsible for making
the goods available to the buyer at the agreed
place, usually at the seller’s premises.
Group F
Group ‘F’ continues with the seller being “free” of
responsibility during the main carriage. Thus,
the seller is called upon to deliver the goods to a
carrier appointed by the buyer. In others words,
he/she is not responsible for the main carriage,
only some pre-shipment charges.
Group C
Group ‘C’ stands for “cost” or “carriage” and
means that the seller is responsible for
contracting and paying for the main carriage, but
26
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without assuming the risk of loss of, or damage
to the goods, or additional costs due to events
occurring after shipment and dispatch.
Group D
Finally, group ‘D’ means “delivery” and rallies
five “arrival” INCOTERMS where the seller is
responsible for the payment and delivery of the
goods to the country of destination. The seller
has to bear all the costs and risks needed to
bring the goods to the country of destination.
Further, INCOTERMS can be classified into two
categories from a delivery perspective: 1)
departure contracts; and, 2) arrival contracts.
“Departure contracts” involve the seller being
responsible for delivering to a named place in the
country of export or departure country. The
seller assumes all costs and risks before crossing
a border. Departure contracts involve groups ‘E’,
‘F’, and ‘C.’ Note that the ‘C’ terms are frequently
misinterpreted as “arrival contracts.” However,
it must be stressed that under ‘C’ terms, as
under the ‘F’ terms, the seller fulfills the
contract in the country of shipment. Thus, the
contracts of sale under the terms ‘C’ falls within
the category of “departure contracts.”
“Arrival contracts” require the seller to bear all
costs and risks involved in bringing the goods to
an overseas point of delivery. In other words,
the seller is responsible for the arrival of the
goods at the agreed place or point of destination
at the border (DAF) or within the country of
destination. Hence, the seller assumes most, if
not all, of the transportation responsibilities.
Arrival contracts only concern ‘D’ trade terms.
Moreover, carriers and freight forwarders may
interpret INCOTERMS according to the following
alternative: “Freight Prepaid” means the seller
pays the main carriage charges before the
departure. Therefore, the seller is responsible for
the costs of the main carriage. It rallies groups ‘C’
and ‘D.’ “Freight Collect,” on the other hand,
means the main carriage charges are collected, or
payable, at destination, thus the buyer is paying
for them. Groups ‘E’ and ‘F’ are involved here.

INCOTERMS 2000
In response to developing technology and
increasing worldwide use of trade terms,
INCOTERMS have been revised for the 21st
century.
The revisions were made by the
Working Party on Trade Terms (WPTT), a group
of 40 trade experts from around the world. The
WPTT is a subgroup of the Committee on
International Practice, which is part of the Parisbased International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC).
After two years of revision of its sales terms for
the new millennium, the ICC began publishing
its new edition, INCOTERMS 2000, since
September 1999. INCOTERMS 2000 are in
effect with contracts beginning on the 1st of
January, 2000, and should only be quoted on
contracts effective from January 2000.

marking is to be made appropriately, especially
when dealing with dangerous goods.
Checking. The seller supports the costs of any
required checking operations, such as checking
quality, measuring, weighing, and counting,
which are necessary for the purpose of placing
the goods at the buyer’s disposal.
Goods in conformity with the contract. The
goods provided by the seller must be in
conformity with the contract of sale. Moreover,
the seller has to enclose the commercial invoice
and any other evidence of conformity as required
by the contract.
Notice to the buyer. The seller must inform
the buyer when and where the goods will be
placed at his/her disposal.
Buyer’s Standard Obligations

Standard Obligations of Each Party
INCOTERMS rely on and apply to a contract of
sale, and do not relate directly to a contract for
carriage. While most of the issues salient to the
use of INCOTERMS relate to maritime
transportation, the negotiation of contractual
obligations represented by INCOTERMS is
critical to the buyer-seller dyad. Next, we cover
the seller’s standard obligations, followed by the
buyer’s standard obligations.
Seller’s Standard Obligations
Packaging and marking. The seller is obliged
to pack the goods in such a manner as is
required for the transport, but only to the extent
that the circumstances relating to the transport
are made known to the seller at the time the
contract of sale is concluded. In addition,

Payment of the price. The buyer must pay the
exact price as provided in the contract of sale.
Take delivery. The buyer must take delivery of
the goods when they have been placed at his/her
disposal in accordance with the designated
INCOTERM.
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Before going into further details for each of the
13 INCOTERMS 2000, a description of the
diagram we use to clarify the 13 INCOTERMS
and definitions of the terms used will help clarify
the discussion and allow the reader a better
understanding. Refer to Figure 1 for the location
of each of these activities in the goods movement.
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FIGURE 1
Country of origin

Charges:

Pre-carriage

Country of destination

THC

Main carriage

•

Pre-carriage: also called “domestic pre
carriage” or “local cartage,” consists of a
point-to-point carriage from the shipper’s
premises or warehouse to the first carrier’s
terminal or to the freight forwarder’s
warehouse. Usually covered by inland
carriers via road, or rail, or a combination of
road-rail (for full container loads moves FCL), symbolized in the scheme by a truck.

•

Export formalities: include export licenses
& authorizations (obtained through
Chambers of Commerce), export declaration
(when the value of the shipment is over U.S.
$2,000, also called Exdec for Export
Declaration), certificate of origin, and more if
needed.

•

•
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Export customs clearance: encompasses
export taxes, duties and fees if required by
the customs of country of exportation.
Terminal: means cargo terminal, railway
station, quay/wharf/port warehouse and/or
airport.

Journal of Transportation Management

THC

On-carriage

•

Terminal Handling Charges (THC) at
origin: also called “FOB charges” by freight
forwarders, include such charges as handling
fee, storage fee, transfer charges (for
transferring from the freight forwarder’s
warehouse to the main carrier’s terminal at
the airport or at the port terminal), file fee,
air way bill or bill of lading fee (for issuing
the transport document), and exceptional
charges by international organizations.

•

Main carriage: deals with the carriage from
a terminal in the country of origin to a
terminal in an overseas country. It can be
air (from airport to airport), ocean (from
seaport to seaport, more usually called “from
quay to quay”), road, rail, inland waterway,
or a combination of such modes.

•

Terminal Handling Charges (THC) at
destination: also called “arrival charges,”
include such charges as transfer charges (for
transferring from the main carrier’s terminal
to the freight forwarder’s warehouse),
handling fee, storage fee, and dispatch fee.

•

Import formalities: includes import licenses
and authorization.

•

Import customs clearance: involves duties,
import taxes, fees and other charges related to
customs.

•

On-carriage: also called “local cartage” or
“domestic on-carriage,” or simply “delivery,”
consists of a point-to-point carriage from the
carrier’s terminal to the consignee’s premises
(most likely the buyer’s premises). Usually
covered by inland carriers via road, or rail, or
a combination of road-rail (for full container
loads moves-FCL), symbolized in the scheme
by a truck.

•

Carrier: a person or entity whom
commences to perform or to procure the
performance of transport by rail, road, air,
ocean, inland waterway or by a combination
of such modes.
COMPARING THE OLD AND THE NEW

•

For each of the INCOTERMS 2000, a description
of the responsibilities and obligations of each
party is stated. Any change between the
INCOTERMS 1990 and INCOTERMS 2000 is
emphasized in bold.
Figure 2 provides a
summary of the characteristics of each of the 13
INCOTERMS.

Multimodal: several different modes of
transport used successively on one single
shipment.

EXW

EX WORKS (...named place)
The seller delivers by placing the goods at the disposal of the buyer at the named place of
delivery, usually the seller’s premises or another named place.

Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Make the goods available at he agreed
place, usually his/her premises.

•

Take delivery of the goods at the agreed place when
available.

•

Load goods on the collecting vehicle.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the goods from
the place of delivery to the desired destination, including:
'"^Pre-carriage,
*THC at origin,
(continued)
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Seller Must

Buyer Must
"•Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and
"•On-carriage.
•

FCA

Provide import customs clearance.

FREE CARRIER (...named place)
The seller delivers the goods to the carrier selected by the buyer at the named
place.

Seller must

Buyer must

•

Deliver the goods to the named place.

•

•

Load goods on the collecting vehicle,
if the delivery occurs at the seller’s
premises.

Unload goods from the collecting vehicle if
delivery occurs at a place other than the seller’s
premises.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage of the
goods from the named place.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the goods
from the place of delivery to the desired destination,
including:

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in
bringing the goods to the place of
delivery, including:

•Pre-carriage,
•THC at origin,
•Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and
•On-carriage.

"•Pre-carriage if the delivery occurs at
any other place but the seller’s premises.

•
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Provide import customs clearance.

FAS

FREE ALONGSIDE SHIP (...named port of shipment)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed alongside the vessel selected by the
buyer at the loading place named by the buyer at the named port of shipment.

Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods to the named port of shipment
alongside the selected vessel.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place delivery, including:

•

Select the carrier.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods from the named port of shipment.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:

• Pre-carriage
•THC at origin

•Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage charges
•Main carriage,
•THC at destination, and
•On-carriage.
•

FOB

Provide import customs clearance.

FREE ON BOARD (...named port of Shipment)
The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail at the named port of shipment.
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Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by
the buyer at the named port of shipment.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including:
"*•
"*■
"*•

Buyer Must
•

Select the carrier.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods from the named port of shipment.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage
charges to the extent that they are not
included in the freight.

"*■
•

CFR

Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage
charges to the extent that they are not
included in the freight,
Main carriage,
THC at destination, and
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.

COST and FREIGHT (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail in the port of shipment.

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by
the buyer at the named port of shipment.

•

Select the carrier.

•

Buyer Must
•

Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
from the time they have passed the ship’s rail at
the port of shipment.

•
Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named port of destination.

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:

•

Provide export customs clearance.

"*■

•

Bear all costs and risks (but only in the country
of origin) involved in bringing the goods to the
place delivery, including:

"*■

*
"<+
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Pre-carriage
THC at origin
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Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that they
are not included in the freight,
THC at destination, and
On-carriage.
(continued)

Buyer Must

Seller Must
**
*

Main carriage
Loading costs: lighterage and wharfage
charges to the extent that they are not
included in the freight.

•

Provide import customs clearance.

COST, INSURANCE, and FREIGHT (...named port of destination)

CIF

The seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail in the port of shipment.

Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
from the time they have passed the ship’s rail
at the port of shipment.

•
Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named port of destination.

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing
the goods from the place of delivery to the
desired destination, including:

•

Provide export customs clearance.

**

•

Contract for the insurance of goods during the
carriage and pay the insurance premium.

•

Deliver the goods on board the vessel selected by
the buyer at the named port of shipment.

•

Select the carrier.

•

•

Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the
place of delivery, including:
"*•
■»
"*•

■*
»
•

Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that
they are not included in the freight,
THC at destination, and
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage
Unloading costs: lighterage and
wharfage charges to the extent that they
are not included in the freight.
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CPT

CARRIAGE PAID TO (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers the goods to the carrier selected by him/her and pays the cost of carriage
necessary to bring the goods to the named destination. The buyer bears all risks and any
other costs occurring after the goods have been delivered.

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods into the custody of the first
carrier.

•

Select the carrier.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named place of destination.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

Buyer Must
•

Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
from the time they are into the custody of the
carrier.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:
"*■

•

Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the
place delivery, including:
"*•
"*•

CIP

•

THC at destination, and
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage

CARRIAGE and INSURANCE PAID TO (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers goods to the carrier selected by him/her and pays the cost of carriage
necessary to bring the goods to the named destination. The buyer bears all risks and any
other costs occurring after the goods have been delivered.
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Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods into the custody of the first
carrier.

•

Select the carrier.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named place of destination.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Contract for the insurance of goods during the
carriage and pay the insurance premium.

•

•

Bear all risks of loss or of damage to the goods
from the time they are into the custody of the
carrier.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:
"*
'*■

•

THC at destination, and
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.

Bear all costs and risks, but only in the country
of origin, involved in bringing the goods to the
place delivery, including:
•
"*
**■

DAF

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage

DELIVERED AT FRONTIER (...named place)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on the arriving
means of transport (not unloaded) before the customs border of the adjoining country.

Seller Must
•

•
•

Deliver the goods at the named frontier (or the
named place at the frontier) but before the
customers border of the adjoining country.
Contract at his/her own expense for the pre
carriage of the goods to the named point.

Buyer Must
•

Take delivery of the goods at the named frontier.

•

Unload goods from the arriving means of
transport at the named place of delivery.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the oncarriage of the goods to the desired destination.

•

Provide import customs clearance.

Provide export customs clearance.
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DES

DELIVERED EX SHIP (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on board the ship
at the named port of destination.

Seller Must

Buyer Must

•

Deliver the goods on board the ship at the named
port of destination.

•

Take delivery of the goods from the ship at the
port of destination.

•

Select the carrier.

•

•

Contact at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named port of destination.

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including:

"*■

•
"*■
"*■
*

DEQ

Unloading costs:
wharfage charges
THC at destination
On-carriage

lighterage

and

Provide import customs clearance.

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage

DELIVERED EX QUAY - DUTY PAID (...named port of destination)
The seller delivers when the goods are placed at the disposal of the buyer on the quay
(wharf) at the named port of destination.
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Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods on the quay at he named port
of destination.

Take delivery of the goods from the ship at the
port of destination.

•

Select the carrier.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named port of destination.

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods from the place of delivery to the desired
destination, including:

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including:

"■*■
"«*•

•

DDU

Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage
Unloading costs:
wharfage charges.

lighterage

THC at destination (other than costs of
unloading the goods from the ship).
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.

and

DELIVERY DUTY UNPAID (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers the goods to the buyer, not cleared for import, and not unloaded from any
arriving means of transport at the named place of destination.

Buyer Must

Seller Must
•

Deliver the goods at the named place of
destination (usually the buyer’s premises).

•

Take delivery of the goods at the named place
of destination.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named place of destination.

•

Unload the goods from any arriving means of
transport.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Provide import customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including:

(continued)

Pre-carriage
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Seller Must
"*•
"*•

Buyer Must

THC at origin
Main carriage
THC at destination
On-carriage.

'"*•

DDP

DELIVERED DUTY PAID (...named place of destination)
The seller delivers the goods to the buyer, cleared for import, and not unloaded from any arriving
means of transport at the named place of destination.

Seller Must

Buyer Must

•

Deliver the goods at the named place of
destination (usually the buyer’s premises).

•

Take delivery of the goods at the named place
of destination.

•

Contract at his/her own expense for the carriage
of the goods to the named place of destination.

•

Unload goods from any arriving means of
transport.

•

Provide export customs clearance.

•

Bear all costs and risks involved in bringing the
goods to the place of delivery, including:
'"*■
"*•
"*
"*•
"*•

•
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Pre-carriage
THC at origin
Main carriage
THC at destination
On-carriage.

Provide import customs clearance.
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FIGURE 2
SUMMARY OF THE 13 INCOTERMS
EXW

FCA

FAS

FOB

CFR

CIF

CPT

CIP

DAF

DES

DEQ

DDU

DDP

Packaging &
marking

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Checking

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

Loading on
the collecting
vehicle

X

Pre-carriage

X1

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

Export
formalities

X

X

Export
customs
formalities

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(X)4

X

X

X

X

(X)4

X

X

X

X

THC at
destination

X

X

On-Carriage

X

X
X

THC at origin
Loading in
the vessel
Contract of
main carriage
Main carriage
costs

X

Main carriage
risks
X

Insurance
Unloading
from the
vessel

xf

X

XL

X

Import
customs
formalities
Unloading
from a
delivering
vehicle
X = Seller pays or is in charge of.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Italic = ocean and inland waterway terms

If FCA Seller’s premises: Pre-carriage is to be borne by the Buyer; if FCA other named place: Pre-carriage is to be borne
by the Seller.
If loading charges are not included in the freight, the Seller pays; if loading charges are included in the freight, the
Buyer pays.
If unloading charges are included in the freight, the Seller pays; if unloading charges are not included in the freight,
the Buyer pays.
The main carriage does not really exist under DAF. The carriage up to the border is just commonly called pre-carriage,
and beyond the border on-carriage.
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ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 CHANGES AND
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The first part of this discussion identifies
extrinsic changes related to the 2000 revision,
whereas the second part focuses on intrinsic
changes of specific terms under which the
obligations and responsibilities of each party
have been modified from the INCOTERMS 1990
to INCOTERMS 2000.

practices. Moreover, the USCIB, the powerful
ICC United States affiliate showed an unusually
active interest in this INCOTERMS revision.
This organization consists of many
“heavyweight” members, some of them large
enough to force any issue with their vendors and
customers. In practice, therefore, this contingent
was instrumental in the revisions completed by
the ICC in 1999.
Intrinsic Changes

Extrinsic Changes
The general extrinsic changes incorporated in
INCOTERMS 2000 over INCOTERMS 1990
relate to: 1) further standardization; 2) greater
international participation; 3) enhanced
language translation; and, 4) a reflection of
increased concerns from U.S. traders. Standard
sales terms fit in with the trend toward
standardization in accordance with The
Harmonized System, Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits in ISO
Certification. In addition, the new INCOTERMS
are more in line with the terms used in the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for
International Sales of Goods (C.I.S.G.). The
latest revision of INCOTERMS is truly global in
nature and process. Though the International
Chamber of Commerce is based in Paris and
most of the creators were from the European
Community, this 21st century revision received
inputs from outside Western Europe at record
levels. As listed in the acknowledgements, the
ICC worked with participants in Canada, China,
Ecuador, Hungary, India, Islamic Republic of
Iran, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States. Though INCOTERMS 2000 is currently
available in English and French, the ICC will for
the first time publish the new version in 20
languages, a deviation from the traditional
French and English-only publications of the first
seven decades of INCOTERMS.
Anecdotally, U.S. traders have appeared more
and more concerned with the advantages
INCOTERMS provide. In fact, changes in the
new version better reflect U.S. business
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The changes in the new version salient to the
various 13 INCOTERMS include specific changes
in: 1) FCA, 2) FAS, 3) DEQ, and, 4) DAF. The
biggest change in the revisions concerns
INCOTERM FCA, Free Carrier. In INCO
TERMS 1990, FCA referred to seven different
modes of transport: air, ocean, inland waterway,
container, multimodal, highway, and unnamed
modes of transport.
Recognizing that
multimodal transport is now the norm, under
INCOTERMS 2000 FCA has now a single
application. If the goods have to be delivered at
the seller’s premises, then the delivery is
contractually completed, and the seller’s
responsibility ends when the goods have been
loaded in the collecting vehicle provided by the
carrier that will deliver the goods to the buyer.
If the delivery occurs at a place other than the
seller’s premises, the seller’s responsibility ends
when the goods are placed at the disposal of the
carrier designated by the buyer.
In other words, if the delivery is not made at the
seller’s premises, then the seller is not obliged to
unload the goods when the goods arrived in the
collecting vehicle at the carrier’s terminal or
freight forwarder’s warehouse. The seller just
leaves the goods at the disposal of the
international carrier, who will unload goods from
the truck, but under the buyer’s responsibility.
Consequently, FCA now allocates more precisely
the costs and risks for unloading operations.
This change is significant because
transshipments are likely to be a source of
litigation due to losses and damages occurring
frequently during transshipments, depending on
the trade lane(s) involved.

Under INCOTERMS 1990, FAS implied that the
buyer had the responsibility to provide export
customs clearance. This responsibility has been
transferred to the seller under INCOTERMS
2000. Consequently, EXW is now the only term
under which the buyer is responsible for export
clearance; under any INCOTERMS other than
EXW, it is now the responsibility of the seller to
clear goods for export. Similar to FAS, under
INCOTERMS 1990, import clearance was the
responsibility of the seller.
However, with
INCOTERMS 2000, it is now the buyer who has
the responsibility of clearing the goods for
import. These two changes significantly ease the
fulfillment of such a legal obligation.
In fact, under INCOTERMS 1990, one party was
forced to deal with the customs rules in the home
country of the other party. Under INCOTERMS
2000, customs issues are now handled by the
local party. Emmanuel Jolivet, ICC’s policy
manager for international commercial practice,
reasons “The reason for the changes, clearly, is
that it is easier for a party living in a particular
country to clear goods for import or export in
his/her own country” (Freudmann 1999).
Reflecting the urgency the ICC working group
desired on this issue, these changes were made
right at the very start of the revision process.
Finally, the term “DAF” now applies only to land
borders, whereas under INCOTERMS 1990, it
could be used for all modes of transport.
Consequently, DAF is now only applicable for
rail or road shipments, or a combination of both
modes of transport.
IMPLICATIONS
Understanding the differences between the
various INCOTERMS will allow for better
negotiation, fewer misunderstandings, and
reduced costs (e.g., financial and opportunity
costs) of conducting trade internationally. There
is strong anecdotal evidence that suggests it is
extremely costly to misunderstand the critical
points at which cost and responsibility legally
transfer from buyer to seller.

On one account the authors are familiar with, a
U.S. Midwestern firm was shipping a full
container load (FCL) of pens and other items
from a seller in Asia. The U.S. firm would
periodically procure items from their Asian
supplier and would engrave corporate logos and
re-sell them to clients throughout the globe.
The INCOTERM negotiated and used was
usually FOB - Singapore, though the seller was
willing to take on more risk and responsibility
(i.e., use another INCOTERM in the C or D
range) for a nominal cost. Recall, under FOB,
the buyer must contract at his/her own expense
for the carriage of the goods from the named port
of shipment, including the procurement of
marine insurance. Under the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA), which ratified the 1937
Hague Rules in the U.S., the steamship line is
only responsible for $500 per container if the
container is lost or destroyed at sea. The
steamship line carrying the container load of
pens hit rough waters and several containers
were lost at sea. The importer, who was not
insured, received $500 for the loss from the
steamship line, though the value of the cargo
was worth well over $125,000 U.S. Dollars. The
firm made a costly mistake that could have been
easily avoided.
The implications for not
understanding the strategic usage of
INCOTERMS can be very detrimental to firms.
Similarly, since May 1st, 1999, the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) went into
effect on U.S. trade lanes. The law effectively
scrapped the century-old concept of “common
carriage” — the notion of equal treatment for
similarly situated shippers (Stapleton and Ghosh
1999). The new law encouraged a landmark
shift from common carriage to contract carriage
(Beargie 1998), by disallowing the practice of a
firm allowing another to undertake the costs of
negotiating with steamship lines for carriage and
simply claiming “similarly situated status” and
demanding a “me-too” rate. OSRA deregulated
the maritime environment and allowed firms to
contract confidentially with steamship lines.
Competitors are no longer allowed to let the
industry leader garner the best possible rate
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(due to volume and negotiating power) and sit
back and claim “similarly situated status.” Since
contracts are now confidential between shippers
and carriers, competing shippers can no longer
figure out the critical elements of a contract,
including the cost and INCOTERM specified
between buyer and seller, or consignee and
consignor. Therefore, a firm who strategically
takes on more cost and risk (by changing to a
Group C or Group D INCOTERM), though
nominal, stands a good chance of increasing
market share.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The main reason for a new revision of
INCOTERMS 1990 was the need to adapt them
to contemporary commercial practice. The intent
of the revision process, which has taken about
two years, was not merely to review each of the
13 INCOTERMS, but to bring them in their
entirety in line with contemporary global trade.
Indeed, the motivation was far beyond formal or
substantial changes. The ICC meant to extend
the use of its trade terms by further globalizing
their concept.
Consequently, the ICC
concentrated on simplifying and standardizing
its terminology to harmonize it with
international trade practices.
This goal seems to have been reached since a
wide-range of world traders participated in this
revision process. It appears more and more
clearly that INCOTERMS now enjoy worldwide
recognition.

Finally, considering that any change involves
adaptation, it should be interesting to study how
these changes affect international trade
practices between buyers and sellers, and how
carriers and freight forwarders react to them.
This can be the subject for a later study in the
new millennium.
As markets continue to expand due to
technological developments in transportation
and logistics, distribution networks will extend
well beyond national frontiers. With obstacles
such as distance, language and business
customs, the allocation of responsibility between
a buyer and a seller of goods becomes even more
crucial. This is where INCOTERMS strategies
will continue to remain critical in international
commerce.
It is hoped that our extensive review of the 13
INCOTERMS and their revision will help
practitioners in both the understanding of the
terms and in realizing their strategic
implications for transporting cargo in the vastly
changing international context of global
commerce. Further, it is our hope that this
discussion will lead to better understanding
among academicians in both the importance of
teaching these rich concepts and in research.
Future research can seek to understand the
strategic implications in the usage of
INCOTERMS; whether adopting one
INCOTERM strategy over another will lead to
competitive advantage; and whether changes in
terminology impact shipping practices similarly
on both sides of the buyer-seller dyad.
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ABSTRACT
In the railroad industry, the ability to assess damages to rail units in an accurate and timely
manner is critical to the success and profits of a company. Accurate damage assessment of
rail units also plays a key role in dispute resolution and negotiation with key vendors and
suppliers (my.uprr.com/pub/dam-prev). This paper describes and presents information about
Union Pacific Railroads (UPRR) and Science Applications International Corporations (SAIC)
highly successful efforts in fully automating the data collection, inspection, assessment and
reporting of damage claims to rail equipment. UPRR and SAIC used an innovative and highly
creative approach to develop and implement the Automated Gate System (AGS) by
integrating a portfolio of leading edge high resolution imaging and optical character
recognition technologies. AGS is a unique and revolutionary system in the transportation
industry and has yielded significant strategic and long-term benefits to the company. The
reengineering efforts that preceded the development of the system have helped the company
to sustain its position as a leader in the railroad industry.
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INTRODUCTION
Union Pacific Corporation is one of North
America's leading transportation, computer
technology and logistics companies, with
operations in all 50 United States, Canada and
Mexico. With headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska,
Union Pacific Corporation currently has over
52.000 employees, covers more than 36,000 miles
of track in 23 states and has an annual payroll in
excess of $3 billion. There are 1700 people in
information technology alone with a budget of
about $250 M. The company's web site at
http://www.uprr.com provides a comprehensive
corporate profile of the company.
Science Applications International Corporation
is the nation's largest employee-owned research
and engineering company, providing information
technology and systems integration products and
services to government and commercial
customers. SAIC scientists and engineers work
to solve complex technical problems in telecom
munications, national security, health care,
transportation, energy, the environment, and
financial services. With annual revenues of $4.7
billion, SAIC and its subsidiaries have more than
38.000 employees at offices in more than 150
cities worldwide.
Intermodal units are critical for the sustained
success of a railroad company and hence it is
important to ensure that these units are in good
working condition. As customers’ demand more
speedy and efficient transportation of goods, rail
intermodal service — the movement of trailers or
containers by rail and at least one other mode of
transportation — is ideally suited to meet this
demand. That is one of the reasons intermodal is
the fastest growing segment of the railroad
industry (my.uprr.com/pub/notes). Intermodal
traffic has grown from 3 million trailers and
containers in 1980 to 8.7 million in 1997 and
accounts for more than 17 percent of rail
revenues, second only to coal at 22 percent
(www.aar.org). Intermodal transportation yields
many powerful benefits (www.aar.org):

•

Fuel efficiency. Rail intermodal service on
average uses less than half as much fuel as
highway transport to move the same
shipment the same distance.

•

Convenience
and
partnerships.
Intermodal combines the door-to-door
convenience of trucks with the long-haul
economy of rail service. As a result, railroads,
trucking companies and intermodal
marketing companies are forming productive
partnerships to combine the best of both
modes.

•

Improved air quality. Moving a ton of
freight by rail instead of truck results in less
than one-third the emissions into the air.

•

Reduced traffic congestion. A single
intermodal train can remove as many as 280
trucks from the highways.

•

Innovative technology.
Intermodal
technology, such as double-stack trains (one
container on top of another) permit one train
with two crew members to remove up to 280
trucks from the highway, reduce pollution
and save energy.

Railroad regulations require the inspection of all
intermodal equipment (vans, containers, chassis)
during yard entry and exit to ensure that
damages to a unit are positively identified and
charged to the responsible party (“Building the
Systems...,” 1999). This is a very critical step if
the railroad is to recover damage claims assessed
by equipment owners and also to win disputes
regarding the timing and extent of damage.
In January of 1995, during a strategic planning
exercise at the company, it became clear that
there was room for improvement in the way the
company managed and maintained its
intermodal units. Reengineering current inter
modal operational process and practices would
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help the company be more responsive to
customer needs while increasing its operational
efficiencies and profits. Due to increased global
competitiveness, customers expected their
transportation companies to be agile and
responsive. After considerable discussion among
top and middle management, the company
established the following primary goals for the
reengineering effort of intermodal operations:

changed. The company decided to completely
automate the in-gate/outgate processes and thus
AGS was born. Currently there are three AGS
systems in place. Marion, Arkansas (outside of
Memphis, TN), Mesquite, Texas, and Kansas
City, Missouri. The fourth system will be
installed in mid to late 2000 in Oakland,
California.
HOW AGS WORKS

•

Increase data accuracy

•

Reduce transaction processing time

•

Increase the rate of collections from damage
claims

•

Increase accuracy of the damage inspection

•

Decrease number of yard personnel

As the reengineering team began to look closely
at the intermodal operations, it became evident
that two processes were big bottlenecks in
achieving desired efficiencies. These were the
ingate (arrival of an intermodal unit at a given
rail yard) and outgate (departure of an
intermodal unit from a rail yard) processes. The
process of manually assessing and recording
damages was slow, cumbersome, and errorprone. Since damages were manually assessed
by physical inspections at the terminal gate,
damages to intermodal equipment were often
missed or inaccurately recorded.
To make
matters worse, in many cases, it was difficult, if
not impossible, to retrace the steps and correct
the inaccuracies. Further, since all damages
were recorded on a form and filed for future
reference, it was impossible to make effective
business decisions involving claims. Managers
often had little or no knowledge of the nature of
the claims and found it difficult to be proactive
based on trends in filed claims. As the volume of
railroad traffic continued to increase
significantly and customers became more
demanding, it became clear that this slow, laborintensive and error-prone process needed to be
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The basic function of the Automated Gate
System (AGS) is to automate the data collection,
inspection, assessment, and reporting processes
at intermodal gates. This required the creative
application and integration of a wide variety of
information technologies. The AGS System
Architecture utilizes three separate network
paths to accomplish the large amount of
throughput required for image transfer and
image display.
Although AGS is based on leading-edge
technologies, (and some even bleeding-edge for
its time), great leadership, outstanding project
management, exemplary team work, a rigid
discipline for organization, and a keen sense for
detail has made AGS a remarkable success story
in the transportation industry. At a cost of more
than two million dollars and four years of
development work, AGS has become a strategic
information system for Union Pacific Railroads.
AGS is the product of a number of technologies
working together in an innovative and
meaningful way. Figure 1 shows the subsystems
that constitute AGS. The following section
explains how AGS works.
Driver Enters Terminal
When an intermodal unit first arrives at a yard,
it is guided by inductive loops embedded in the
pavement at strategic locations in the yard. Live
digital video conferencing technology facilitates
communication between the AGS operator and
the intermodal driver at the gate stand. For
example, each gate stand in a rail yard has a

FIGURE 1
(This diagram shows the communications links between various applications. Numbered links are
TCP/IP sockets; lettered links are Win32 messages.)
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color video camera that displays a live image of
the driver on the AGS workstation monitor. This
image is captured as a digital snapshot and
attached to the transaction images.
Also,
mounted directly to the rear of each gate stand
lane is a two-way digital audio system that
facilitates communication between the driver
and the AGS operator when the driver is at the
rear of the unit. Each gate stand has a call
button to notify the AGS operator of the need to
communicate verbally and this appears as a
visual display on the AGS monitor. The AGS
operator uses a hands-free head set for voice
communication with the truck driver and a foot
pedal to activate the unit’s transmission.
Instructional signs direct the driver to wait until
the portal control light turns green. A portal is
composed of ten digital cameras, four light
curtains, and two Automatic Equipment
Identification antennas. There are seven linescan cameras that take a Vs” slice of video as the
truck drives through the portal at 10 MPH and
three area scan cameras that take area pictures
of the rear of the intermodal unit and its tires.
The Video Inspection System integrates image
analysis, vehicle axle count and optical character
recognition technologies. Optical character

recognition identifies and scans alphanumeric
characters on the left side, right side and back
side of a unit to produce a high-resolution digital
image of the top, sides, nose, rear, tires and
under carriage of all units passing through the
portal. These images are stored locally for
playback review to inspect damages, validate
equipment identification marks and hazardous
material placards. The results of this scan are
then compared with data residing in the
Intelligent Character Recognition (ICR) system,
an integrated database of all equipment
identification prefixes. The AGS operator can
perform a visual inspection of the images after a
single unit or multiple units (as in the case of
“pups”) pass through the camera portal. Using
“point and click” screen icons, the operator can
review the images.
Based on the images, the vehicle at the yard is
then classified into one of the following:
1. A tractor (bobtail)
2. Tractor with chassis
3. Tractor with trailer or container tractor with
multiple trailers or containers or nonintermodal vehicles.

FIGURE 2
GATE CONTROL SCREEN THAT UPDATES THE STATUS
OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING UNITS
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Interior Inspection
The next step is to ensure the accurate
inspection of the unit. Mounted directly to the
rear of each gate stand lane is a color camera
that views and takes live images of the inside of
the unit. These images are then displayed and
controlled by the AGS operator using the GATE
CONTROL function to inspect empty returned
units or blocking and bracing of loads to ensure
that the load inside the container does not shift
in transit. Refer to Figure 2.
Once the unit passes properly through the
camera portal, the system creates an icon to
represent the unit on the AGS operator’s
monitor. The icon includes the initial of the unit
and its identification number, which are then
displayed in the "portal queue" areas on AGS.
Refer to Figure 3.

FIGURE 3
ICONS AS THEY APPEAR
ON THE GATE CONTROL SCREEN

and a magnetic card reader. A Gate Stand
computer is installed at each inbound and
outbound lane. The Gate Stand is the driver’s
interface and lane controller. These computers
are intended to gather pertinent information
from the driver and transfer that information to
the System Controller for validation and further
use in the process. The Gate Stand computer is
also used to allow the controller at the Playback
to communicate with the driver.
AGS prompts the user with screen menus for
data entry in order to process the gate
transaction. The driver interface is designed to
be as user friendly as possible with minimum
interaction from the driver yet still gather as
much of the required data as possible before the
AGS operator is needed (if needed) to complete
the transaction. The data the driver is asked to
input is relevant to the particular transaction
type as identified by the system. In most cases,
it is expected that the data input received from
the driver will leave the AGS operator with
handling only exceptions or lack of required
data. If, at any time during the process, the
driver is unable to complete the data entry, the
AGS operator may intervene and complete any
portion or all of the transaction.

bobtail
chassis
van
container
multiples

Once the icon appears on the AGS screen, the
operator begins the inspection process by
viewing the images. A gate stand refers to an
interactive monitor, a keyboard, two-way hands
free voice intercom, call button, driver image
capture, printer, electronic driver identification,

AGS allows for inspection at any time, i.e., as
soon as the units arrive or at a later time, as
long as the images are available. This allows
terminal managers at different yards to establish
their own policies and guidelines as to when the
inspection should be done. While viewing the
images the AGS operator may inspect and report
damage (if applicable) and verify equipment
identification marks.
The destination
information is supplied and formatted on the
playback display. As indicated earlier, since
each gate stand has a video camera to capture a
live image of the driver, a still snapshot of the
driver is captured automatically and stored with
the gate transaction. Each gate stand also has a
magnetic card reader that allows drivers to
swipe their identification cards and capture and
match the driver’s identification in the system.
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System Output
Each gate stand also has an enclosed ticket
printer that automatically feeds the gate receipt
when the transaction has been processed. A gate
receipt is similar to an invoice that vendors use
to receive payment for delivering or picking up
units. The gate receipt on a complete transaction
includes information about the date, time,
location, driver name, initial and number of the
chassis, yard disposition instructions, and
information about damages, if any.
The driver enters the unit initial and number or
presses the NO key to identify a bobtail
transaction (a transaction to indicate that the
driver is in the yard to just pick up a unit. This
information is compared with units in the ingate
queue to identify a match. If one is found, the
unit icon on the GATE CONTROL display on the
AGS workstation is automatically moved to the
gate stand to associate the data input with the
portal images. If a match is not found, the driver
is prompted to verify the input and re-enter the
data. If the driver validates the information and
a match is still not found, AGS notifies the AGS
operator to complete the transaction.

yard, until another seal has been supplied and
the new number entered in the system. In the
case of multiple units (as in the case of “pups”),
the driver enters the details for each unit and
the steps are repeated until details about all
units are entered in the system.
Once the driver completes the input process, the
AGS operator assumes responsibility for
completing the transaction. The data collected is
sent to TCS in the form of a van arrival for TCS
processing. If the message is processed without
errors, a buckslip is printed at the gate stand
and the driver has the option to inquire about
units in the yard for pickup.
Otherwise the
system is reset for the next transaction.
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND AGS

Next, AGS checks for equipment classification
(in the case of a chassis, gate control is handed
over to the AGS operator to complete the
transaction as there is no further input required
from the driver.). AGS then generates a data
packet to send to the mainframe (TCS) to check
for billing information. If billing information is
not found in the TCS, the system will prompt the
driver to identify if the unit is loaded or empty.
The goal is to collect as much required data as
possible from the driver to assist in any billing
inquiry activity.

The AGS system consists of Acquisition
computers, Gate Stand computers, Playback
computers, Image Server computers and a
System Controller Computer.
Acquisition
Computers reside in the Signal Cabin which is
physically centered between the In and Out
portals. There are three Acquisition computers
for each portal: Left Acquisition, Right
Acquisition and Auxiliary Acquisition. The Left
Acquisition computer is responsible for capturing
and transferring image data from the three line
scan cameras mounted on the left side of the
portal. The Right Acquisition computer is
responsible for capturing and transferring image
data from the three line scan cameras mounted
on the right side of the portal. The Auxiliary
Acquisition computer is responsible for the Top
Scan, Rear Shot and Left and Right Tire Shots.
The Auxiliary Acquisition computers handle the
I/O from the portals as well as from the queuing
lanes.

The next AGS screen captures the seal numbers
and contents associated with each unit. The
shipping company applies a seal to each unit in
order to prevent any tampering with the
contents. If the seal is missing, then Union
Pacific will not allow the unit to enter the rail

Gate Stand computers were described earlier.
Playback Computers serve as the user interface
to the AGS System and are located in the
Operations area of the Gate House. They are
used to display truck images and handle the gate
process which involves getting information from
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the driver and verifying that the driver can enter
the yard. This process can also involve creating
damage reports, registering drivers and possibly
establishing a video conference with the driver at
a gate stand.
The In-Portal Image Server and Out-Portal
Image Server computers are located in a rack in
the communications room in the Gate House.

Each Image Server handles the reception of the
raw image data, creates the viewed images and
handles the archiving of the image to optical
disk. The System Controller computer is also
located in a rack in the communications room in
the Gate House and is responsible for handling
all of the data packets passed between machines
as well as maintaining the truck image database.
The team structure for AGS is shown in Figure
4.

FIGURE 4
TEAM STRUCTURE FOR AGS
Program
Manager
Contract
Manager

Domain
Expert

Project
Controls
Project
Manager

Drafting'
Shipping
Receiving
Procurement

System
Engineer

Installation
Hardware Sr. Software Technical
Technician Engineer(s)
Writer
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MEASURE OF SUCCESS
AGS has become one of the most successful
information systems in the company’s history
and continues to yield significant extrinsic and
intrinsic benefits to the company and to its
customers.
A recent cost/benefit analysis
comparing hand held technology with AGS
shows a 75% reduction in labor at the three
existing locations.
The ROI of AGS is
approximately 40%. Some of the benefits of AGS
include
•

Increased Customer Satisfaction. AGS
helped reduce time to process units at the
gate by more than 70%. Thus customers
were able to get in and get out of the yards
quickly, leading to significant efficiencies for
both UP and its customers.
Further,
customer satisfaction increased when AGS
was implemented.

•

Increased Revenue.
While revenue
attributable to AGS is confidential, it is safe
to say that profits attributed to AGS are
significant.
Further, evidence points to
greater throughput for drayage companies,
which increases their ability to achieve
higher volumes of traffic through the rail
yards.

•

Reduction in Personnel.
Significant
reductions were achieved in the number of
personnel required at the gates. In several
yards around the country, the number of
internal gate operators decreased by more

"Building the Systems: Why Architecture
Matters," (1999). Nation's Cities Weekly, Vol.
22, No. 10, pp. 9-10.
http://www.aar.org/comm/statfact.nsf/5406ac73
3125e6c7852564d000737b60/fdf95cfeef772fc
3852568800067074d.
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than 50% while the number of outside gate
operators has been completely eliminated.
•

Improved Decision-Making.
AGS
continues to play an important role in
enhancing the quality of decisions. There
has been a significant increase in the
integrity and accuracy of critical
transportation data collected at the yards,
leading to better decision making at the rail
yards and throughout the company.

•

Reduction in damage claims. Finally,
AGS has helped Union Pacific to achieve
significant reduction in damage claims paid
to its customers.
Since photographic
documentation of all units passing through
the AGS data acquisition portals is available,
it is easy to settle claims, thus decreasing the
number of litigious claims.

•

Leader in the field. Union Pacific is a
leader in the field and hence customers have
high expectations of the company. Managers
attribute the smooth flow of traffic through
the rail yards to AGS. Charles Whited,
Senior Manager of the Union Pacific
Intermodal Terminal, Marion, AR, says, “ For
example, on 8/11/99 we did 1,065 arrivals
and departures. It is my opinion that traffic
flow and congestion is much better than with
any other system we have had. Also, this is
done with fewer people working the gate.
With AGS we have 3 people at peak 7am to
1900pm and one person at other times.
Without AGS I believe we would need 8
people at peak and 4 at other times.”

http://my.uprr.com/pub/notes/INetBull/2f82_20
2.shtml.
http://my.uprr.com/pub/dam-prev/loading/
intguide/intguil.shtml.
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TRUCKLOAD TRANSPORTATION
REQUIREMENTS: IN ANTICIPATION
OF Y2K WITH EPILOGUE
John L. Kent
Southwest Missouri State University
R. Stephen Parker
Southwest Missouri State University
Charles E. Pettijohn
Southwest Missouri State University

This article investigates the impact of the much-hyped Y2K phenomenon on truckload
transportation requirements in the United States, as a result of year-end inventory build-ups.
The article reports the results of a Y2K Truckload Transportation Survey of truckload
shippers conducted in August of 1999. Additionally, the article takes a post-hoc look at what
actually occurred in an effort to completely document the impact of the Y2K phenomenon in
the dry van, temperature controlled, and flatbed segments of the truckload transportation
industry.

INTRODUCTION
It is highly unlikely that many of us escaped the
what-if scenarios of the Y2K phenomenon.
These scenarios ranged from a non-event
scenario where nothing happens and life goes on
without a hitch, to the more media-hyped
doomsday scenario where civilization as we know
it disintegrates as humans are incapable or
unprepared to exist without computer
assistance. Olgeirson (1999) describes this latter
scenario in a hypothetical situation where, in
each case, the worst does happen, panic sets in,
and society self-destructs. As businesses and
governments had spent $300 to $600 billion

dollars world wide (Hamilton and Wong, 1999) in
preparation for this event, reality was thought to
fall between these two scenarios.
The transportation industry was no exception in
terms of preparation for tracking carriers,
shipments, and invoices. In fact, Hamilton and
Wong (1999) point out that as the transportation
industry is the central force in the supply chain,
how this industry reacted to and prepared for
the Y2K phenomenon would have far reaching
effects on everyone from manufacturers to endusers. They further contend that not all reports
on transportation preparedness were
encouraging. In fact, by some estimates, the
Fall 1999
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transportation industry ranked near the bottom
of industries addressing the Y2K problem and it
was estimated that approximately 50% of these
companies would experience mission-critical
failures.
Brandt (1999) reported that a
government survey conducted by the Special
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology
Problem revealed only 62% of the responding
transportation companies had completed Y2K
preparations.
Medium sized fleets were
described as facing the largest challenge in
preparing for the year 2000 since they typically
have fewer people on their technology staffs than
do the larger companies. Further, 50% reported
that they anticipated being involved in some type
of litigation resulting from the Y2K phenomenon.
The litigation issue was compounded by
contractual agreements involving just-in-time
deliveries. Leffort (1999) reported that the
transportation industry in general was in a very
difficult position, as they rely on every member
of the supply chain.
However, it was thought that the Y2K
phenomenon might have provided a profit
making business opportunity for the
transportation industry. For example, at least
one large trucking firm postponed its annual
company Christmas party in anticipation of
increased demands on its ability to transport the
vast volume of goods being purchased by
numerous businesses prior to any possible
disruption in the supply chain. This expectation
of increased usage was not an isolated view.
Watson (1999) noted that shippers were
protecting themselves from any potential Y2K
associated problems by stocking increased
inventories. As a result of this increase in safety
stock, shippers pre-booked shipments to assure
adequate equipment availability.
Watson
further noted that this increase in bookings
might have increased margins by 2% to 4% in
the motor carrier industry. A variety of other
potentially positive outcomes also existed.
Hamilton and Wong (1999) suggested that by
being forced to deal with the Y2K problem
companies improved a variety of processes and
products. These improvements included areas
such as better communication, standardized bar
56

Journal of Transportation Management

coding and electronic manifests, and the
simplification of multi-mode shipment tracking.
While it is clear that there was a range of both
positive and negative aspects to the Y2K
phenomenon, the lack of specific information on
how firms prepared was disconcerting.
Thibodeau (1998) reported that many surveys
relating to year 2000 readiness were never
returned, perhaps as a result of either being
unprepared or concerned about their responses
being used in future litigation.
In the
transportation industry, adequate Y2K
preparation was a critical determinant of a firm’s
ability to satisfy their customers, maintain sales
and market share, increase profits, and
ultimately ensure long-term survival. Thus,
from a strategic perspective, Y2K preparedness
had significant repercussions.
While the
majority of existing research on Y2K has focused
on computer issues, the primary purpose of this
study was to examine the customer base of a
large truckload motor carrier to determine if
their customers anticipated an increase in third
and fourth quarter shipping requirements in an
effort to supplement inventories.
Such an
examination had numerous strategic
implications for this carrier, as it attempted to
forecast the affect Y2K might have on its market
position and profitability. Secondarily, this
study examined what actually transpired with
regard to truckload transportation requirements
as we entered the new millennium.
METHODOLOGY
During August of 1999 approximately six
hundred shippers utilizing temperature
controlled, flatbed, and dry van truckload
transportation services were mailed a one page
Y2K Truckload Transportation Survey. Ninetyeight or 16% of the shippers returned the survey.
In the context of Y2K, each of the shippers was
asked four primary questions. The first question
was, does your firm anticipate an increase in
truckload transportation requirements for the
second half of 1999? The second question asked,
if your firm anticipates the need for extra
trailers during the second half of 1999 would you

be willing to rent or lease the trailers? Next the
shippers were asked, does your firm anticipate
any other additional truckload related services
during the second half of 1999? Finally, each
shipper was asked to indicate the percentage
increase expected for truckload transportation
requirements from the first half of 1999 to the
second half of 1999.
RESULTS
The overall survey results are provided in Exhibit
1. As shown in the exhibit, forty-four percent of
the respondents indicated they anticipated an
increase in their truckload transportation
requirements in anticipation of Y2K.
An
examination of the table also indicates the
magnitude of the anticipated increases in
transportation requirements in anticipation of
Y2K. The results show that refrigerated ship
ments were expected to experience the greatest
gain, with a 34% increase forecast for the final six
months of 1999 over the first six months of 1999.
Dry van truckload requirement increases were
also large, with an increase of 22%. Flatbed
shipments were expected to increase by only 11%.

Additionally, the results were analyzed by
comparing the three service types (i.e.,
temperature controlled, flatbed, and dry van) for
each of the survey questions. Of the respondents
that indicated a primary service type, 56%
indicated temperature controlled, 27% indicated
flatbed, and 17% indicated dry van. Pearson chisquare values were calculated for each of the
three service types with cross-tabs for each of the
survey questions. No statistically significant
differences were found between the service types.
While 44% of the respondents indicated that they
anticipated increases in their transportation
requirements in anticipation of Y2K, the respon
dents did not anticipate a strong demand for the
use of additional truckload related services during
the last six months of 1999. As the exhibit shows,
only 9.5% of the respondents indicated a need for
additional truckload services at the end of the
year. With regard to the shippers’ willingness to
lease trailers, the results indicate that few of the
respondents expressed an interest in leasing
trailers, with only three percent indicating a
desire to lease.

EXHIBIT 1
Y2K TRUCKLOAD TRANSPORTATION SURVEY RESULTS
Question

Yes

No

No Response

Does your firm anticipate an increase in truckload
transportation requirements for the second half of
1999?

44%

50%

6%

If your firm anticipates the need for extra trailers
during the second half of 1999, would you be willing to
rent or lease the trailers?

3%

75%

22%

Does your firm anticipate any other additional
truckload-related services during the second half of
1999?

9.5%

80%

11.5%

Overall percentage increase in anticipated
truckload shipments from second half of 1999
over the first half of 1999

Refrigerated
34%

Flatbed
11%

Dry Van
22%
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CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL
IMPLICATIONS
The findings provided guidance for managers as
they attempted to develop their marketing
strategies in anticipation of Y2K.
One
implication that may be derived from the results
is that most shippers did not seem to anticipate
the “apocalyptic” results often discussed in the
media. In fact, one might contend that the
findings show that most respondents believed
that Y2K would have very little impact on their
shipping requirements, as fifty percent of the
respondents indicated that they did not
anticipate an increase in their truckload
transportation requirements in the six months
prior to the year 2000. Furthermore, the vast
majority of respondents contended that they
would not be interested in obtaining additional
trailers or additional truckload related services
in the second half of 1999, again supporting the
perception that the impact of Y2K was expected
to be minimal. The perception that Y2K would
have little impact on the requirements of the
majority of shippers may also be advanced by the
non-respondents. It may be argued that those
not responding to the survey also did not
anticipate changes in their shipping
requirements as they approached the new
millennium. This argument may be advanced
based on the premise that customers who
anticipated any changes in their shipping
requirements would be well-advised to make
those changes known to facilitate their supplier’s
ability to meet their changing requirements.
The fact that they did not respond might
indicate that they did not anticipate changes in
their shipping needs.
However, prior to dismissing the affect of Y2K on
the requirements of shippers, it should be noted
that forty-four percent of the respondents
indicated that they anticipated an increase in
their truckload transportation requirements in
the second half of 1999. This forecast may have
been indicative of a forecasted derived demand
for their products. For example, as the media
communicated the dire consequences of the Y2K,
consumers could have begun acquiring an
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inventory of essential products. This consumer
acquisition process could have been the catalyst
for additional production of these products,
which in turn generates additional
transportation demands for various shippers.
This argument may be supported by the Finding
that refrigerated shipping was anticipating the
greatest increase. Since refrigerated shipping
may be associated with perishable items, and
since one possible consequence of Y2K was a
shortage of basic foodstuffs, products that
require refrigerated shipping would be ones that
could be expected to be in greater demand.
Correspondingly, the relatively low increase in
expected truckload requirements for flatbed
shipping (11%) may be indicative of the fact that
flatbed commodities and heavy equipment did
not experience the increased demand that would
result from Y2K fears. Thus, Y2K fears could
have been allayed by the purchase of subsistence
items such as food, generators, heaters,
batteries, etc. which would likely be shipped via
refrigerated or dry van shippers.
In conclusion, these findings should have
provided the truckload transportation industry
with guidance that should have provided
assistance in developing their strategies and
tactics prior to the new millennium. First,
strategically the firm should have recognized
that those shippers anticipating an increase in
their requirements represented a target market
that could be extremely profitable, both in the
present and in the future. By preparing to
satisfy the needs of this market, the firm may
have been able to gain a stronger market
position in comparison with carriers who have
failed to forecast, and consequently failed to
prepare for increases in demand. The stronger
market position may then have been used as a
means of developing a competitive advantage in
future relationships with this market. However,
to gain a stronger competitive position with this
market, the firm may be required to maintain or
enhance its normal level of service, maintain its
value-oriented pricing policies, and take
significant steps toward ensuring customer
satisfaction in order to create a long-term gain
from a short-term sales opportunity. Second, the

results also indicated that the firm’s efforts in
optimizing the opportunities presented by Y2K
might have been well targeted to specific types of
businesses. This targeting may have been
facilitated by an evaluation of the “type” of
shipper anticipating increases in demand. If, as
argued, shippers anticipating increases in their
shipping requirements were those involved with
“subsistence” items, then targeting firms
producing and marketing such items may have
provided the catalyst for the development of a
new customer base.
The majority of shippers participating in this
study did not expect changes in their shipping
requirements, thus arguing against any dire
results from the advent of the new century.
Further, even those who anticipated changes did
not seem to be forecasting major changes in their
requirements as indicated by the relatively few
respondents who were willing to lease trailers or
who expected to use any additional truckload
services during the second half of 1999. Thus,
the basic conclusion that was advanced is that
well-targeted preparations may provide a long
term market advantage to the carriers prepared
for changes in shipping requirements associated
with Y2K, but that the preparations should be
well-targeted and not designed for the majority
of shippers.
EPILOGUE
With the exception of some of the world’s most
spectacular celebrations, the start of the third
millennium appears to have been a non-event.
The doomsday forecasts have come and gone
with the Y2K bug, which, to this point in time,
has been little more that a common cold. Levy
(2000) reports that the United States spent
around $100 billion and the world outlay was
closer to $500 billion. Did we over spend? No
one yet knows, as some “experts” predict that
only about 1% of the problems would occur on
the rollover date, with others appearing later in
the year. However, what we do know is that
very few problems have actually occurred to date
and those that did are seen as being very minor
in nature. Kisiel (2000) for example, reports that

the automobile industry was well prepared for
the problem and has experienced little more that
a few robots not working correctly and other very
minor problems, such as incorrect dates, that
were fixed very quickly.
The motor carrier for whom the research
reported in this study was conducted was not
surprised when the year ended. Just as the
results of the study conducted in August of 1999
indicated, a surge in truckload shipping
requirements as the result of inventory hedging
by their shippers did not occur. The postponed
Christmas party should have been held during
December, just as in prior years. The fourth
quarter results indicated no more than the
normal seasonal increase in traffic and no sign of
buyers hoarding raw materials or finished goods.
Furthermore, demand for truckload
transportation services in the first quarter of the
new millennium was stable for this motor
carrier. This stability indicates that inventory
levels were not significantly increased in
anticipation of Y2K or first quarter demand
would have almost certainly declined.
Additionally, when asked if the costs associated
with Y2K preparation had paid off. The firm’s
management responded with a definite yes.
They stated, “clearly the minimal cost associated
with the shipper survey, along with a little more
time spent coordinating with the few shippers
that were identified in the survey as potential
Y2K problem shippers, paid off. We had a
smooth, problem-free transition into the new
millennium.” In short, the bug may not have
bitten, but it did force businesses to examine
their communication links to supply chain
members with whom computer contact is
essential. As a result, many companies are
probably better off than prior to the Y2K event.
In retrospect, it appears that the disasters
associated with Y2K were more hype than real.
The results of the hype, however, may be
perceived in different ways. From a negative
perspective, the hype resulted in some cases in
the change of business strategies and tactics.
These changes resulted in an improper
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deployment of human, technical, and financial
resources.
Conversely, the Y2K hype also resulted in some
potentially positive activities.
As stated,
transportation firms not only increased
communications with their markets customers,
they also were “forced” to reassess their

strategies. The hype actually may have resulted
in motivating many transportation companies to
audit their current strategies, resources and
tactics and develop contingency plans. These
audits and reassessments probably created more
long-term planning activity, which should in
turn result in improved asset utilization in the
future.
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Guidelines for Submission/Publication
FRONT MATTER
1.

First Page—Title of the paper, name and position of the author(s), author(s) complete
address(es) and telephone number(s), e-mail address(es), and any acknowledgment of
assistance.

2.

Second Page—A brief biographical sketch of each author including name, degree(s) held, title
or position, organization or institution, previous publications and research interests.

3.

Third Page—Title of the paper without author name(s) and a brief abstract of no more than
100 words summarizing the article. The abstract is used on the Contents page of the JTM
and serves to generate reader interest in the full article.

FORMATTING
1.

Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced (body of text only), on white 8 V2 by 11 inch
paper.

2.

Submit four (4) paper copies of the manuscript for review. It is not necessary to send a disk
for the initial review. However, to save time and effort if accepted, the article should be
prepared using either:
WordPerfect 9.0 or lower
OR
Microsoft Word 95 or lower

3.

Accepted articles, in final form, are to be submitted on disk (in WordPerfect or Microsoft Word
format as described above) and in hard copy. Note: Macintosh versions of WordPerfect and
Microsoft Word are NOT acceptable.

4.

The entire manuscript should have 1" margins on all sides in Times 10-point font. Times New
Roman or Century Schoolbook are both acceptable.

5.

The entire manuscript must be typed LEFT-JUSTIFIED, with the exception of tables and
figures.

TITLE PAGE AND ABSTRACT
1.

The manuscript title should be printed in Times 11-point and in all capital letters and bold
print.

2.

Author(s) and affiliation(s) are to be printed in upper and lower case letters below the title.
Author(s) is(are) to be listed with affiliation(s) only.

3.

The abstract should be 100 words or less.

BODY OF MANUSCRIPT
1.

Main headings are bolded and in all caps.

2.

First level headings are upper/lower case and bolded.

3.

Second level headings are upper/lower case.

4.

The body is NOT indented, rather a full blank line is left between paragraphs.

5.

A full blank line should be left between all headings and paragraphs.

6.

Unnecessary hard returns should not be used at the end of each line.

TABLES AND FIGURES
1.

ONLY Tables and Figures are to appear in camera-ready format!

2.

All tables MUST be typed in WordPerfect table or Microsoft Word table functions. Tables should
NOT be tabbed or spaced to align columns. Column headings should not be created in separate
tables. Table titles should not be created as part of the table. All tables MUST be either 3 1/4
inches wide or 6 7/8 inches wide.

3.

All figures MUST be saved in one of these formats: TIFF, CGM, or WPG.

4.

Tables and figures are NOT to be included unless directly referred to in the body of the
manuscript.

5.

For accepted manuscripts, tables and figures must be included on the submitted disk and
each should be printed on a separate page.

6.

Placement of tables and figures in the manuscript should be indicated as follows:
Table or Figure About Here

EQUATIONS, CITATIONS, REFERENCES, ETC.
1.

Equations are placed on a separate line with a blank line both above and below, and
numbered in parentheses, flush right. Examples:
y = c + ax + bx
y = a + lx + 2x + 3x + ax

2.

(1)
(2)

References within the text should include the author's last name and year of publication
enclosed in parentheses, e.g. (Cunningham 1993; Rakowski and Southern 1996). For more
than one cite in the same location, references should be in chronological order, as above. For
more than one cite in the same year, alphabetize by author name, such as (Grimm 1991;
Farris 1992; Rakowski 1992; Gibson 1994). If practical, place the citation just ahead of a
punctuation mark. If the author's name is used within the text sentence, just place the year
of publication in parentheses, e.g., "According to Rakowski and Southern (1996)...,". For
multiple authors, use up to three names in the citation. With four or more authors, use the
lead author and et al., (Mundy et al. 1994).

3.

Footnotes may be used where necessary. Footnotes are in 8-point font and should appear
at the bottom of the page using numbers (1, 2, etc.). Note: footnotes should be explanatory
in nature if used, not for reference purposes.

4.

All references should be in block style. Hanging indents are not to be used.

5.

Appendices follow the body of the text but do not precede references.

6.

The list of references cited in the manuscript should immediately follow the body of the text
in alphabetized order, with the lead author's surname first and the year of publication
following all author names. Work by the same author with the same year of publication
should be distinguished by lower case letters after the date (e.g., 1996a). For author names
that repeat, in the same order, in subsequent cites, substitute a .5 inch underline for each
name that repeats. A blank line should separate each reference in the list. Do not number
references.

7.

All references to journals, books, etc. are italicized, NOT underlined. Examples are as follows:

Collison, Fredrick M. (1994), "Transpacific Air Service with Flong Kong: Characteristics and Issues,"
Journal of Transportation Management, 6(2): 1-39.
Crum, Michael R. (1996), "On the Improvement of Carrier EDI Implementation Strategies," in EDI
Implementation in the Transportation Industry, New York: Transportation Press, 387-404.

Johnson, James C. & Donald F. Wood (1996), Contemporary Logistics, 6th ed., Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
TEACHING LOGISTICS STUDENTS TO TAKE OWNERSHIP OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
Frank W. Davis, University of Tennessee
Kenneth J. Preissler, Logistics Insights Corporation
Logistics systems, developed gradually over the past decades, are undergoing necessary radical change in this era of
increasing global competition. This article describes an approach taken by the authors to teach logistics students
how to take ownership of designing their own information infrastructure and how to use it to make their
organizations more flexible, providing more strategic options.

INTRODUCTION
Advances in information systems technology such as data base management systems, bar code scanning,
telecommunications, and image processing have enabled logistics and information managers with vision to
reengineer the way the firm conducts its business. The usage of mainframe computers, personal computers, and
logistics information systems has been widely studied (Gustin 1989). These studies have universally concluded that
there has been a rapid growth in the usage of computers and logistics information systems.

Computer Usage in the Classroom
The usage of computer applications in a logistics course has also been studied. Rao, Stenger and Wu stated that
there are several approaches to integrating computers into the classroom in a business curriculum, each with its
individual advantages and drawbacks (1992).

Table 1 about here

Systems Development In Practice
The study of the information systems development process of computer applications has been almost universally left
up to the computer science, software engineering, and information systems educators and practitioners.
y = a + lx + ax

(1)
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